DALIP KAUR Vs. HARBANS SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Harbans Singh respondent entered into an agreement dt. March, 25, 1982 with Smt. Dalip Kaur petitioner No. 1 whereby the latter agreed to sell the land measuring 30 kanals, 9 marlas for consideration of Rs. 55,000/-. He filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining her from alienating the said land in which a consent decree was passed on Jan., 21, 1983. In spite thereof petitioner No. 1 sold the land and executed sale deed in favour of petitioner No. 2 on Aug., 4, 1983. When the deed was presented to the Sub-Registrar for registration, Harbans Singh appeared there and apprised him of the decree. Still the deed was registered. So he moved the present application for execution of the decree and for taking contempt proceedings. Respondents Nos.1 and 6 only seem to have filed their replies who admitted the factum of the sale but denied the existence and knowledge of the alleged decree. The Executing Court exonerated respondents Nos.3 to 5 and 7; holding respondents Nos.1, 2 and 6 (now petitioners Nos. 1, 2 and 6) guilty of the disobedience of the decree, set aside the sale and ordered the attachment of the salary of petitioner No. 6 and attachment of the suit land as well as other property of petitioners Nos. 1 and 2. Aggrieved thereby all the respondents in the executing court have come up in this revision although the prayer against petitioners Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 7 for taking action had been declined.

(2.) The proceedings under O.21, R.32 of the C.P.C. are execution proceedings and order of attachment of property or detention in civil prison can be passed only against the judgment-debtor and not a third party. There is also no jurisdiction under the said rule to set aside any sale made in disobedience of the decree of injunction. So, the order made against petitioners Nos.2 and 6 for the attachment of the salary, the land sold and other property and the setting aside of the sale has to be quashed being wholly without jurisdiction.

(3.) So far as the judgment-debtor is concerned, he can be ordered to be detained in civil prison or his property attached, but that too can be done only for the enforcement of the decree. The land respecting which a decree for permanent injunction restraining petitioner No.1 from alienating it was passed, has since been sold. It is, therefore, not possible to enforce the decree either by attachment of the property of the judgment-debtor or by detaining him in civil prison. The proceedings under R.32 are not meant to punish the judgment-debtor for disobedience of the decree. If the judgment-debtor renders himself incapable of performing the decree, he may be liable to be proceeded against under the Contempt of Courts Act, but no action under R.32 can be taken by way of punishment to the judgment-debtor.