MEENA RANI JAIN Vs. HAZARI LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal is directed against the decree for restitution of conjugal rights passed in favour of the husband Hazari Lal.

(2.) THE marriage between the parties was solemnised on January 22, 1980. Out of this wedlock, a female child was born in November, 1980. They separated in early 1981. The wife, Meena Rani Jain filed the petition under Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, (hereinafter called the Code), for maintenance on June 13, 1983, which was allowed on October 3, 1984. The husband filed the petition for restitution of conjugal rights on October 23, 1984. It was alleged therein that the wife used to pick up quarrels with her husband and impressed upon him to segregate from his parents. Ultimately, she left for her parents' house with her younger brother Suresh and carried all valuable clothes and ornaments contending that she will return if he got separated from his parents and, thus, she did not come back. When she was approached by him, he was told that she will come after delivery in case he separated from his parents meanwhile. When the husband along with his parents went to see the child she again pressed for his separation from his parents and finally refused to live with him unless he got separated. Thus, it was maintained, that the wife had withdrawn from the society of her husband without any reasonable excuse since August, 1980. In the written statement, it was pleaded on behalf of the wife that the petition had been filed with a mala fide intention as maintenance allowance had been allowed to the wife and daughter under Section 125 of the Code vide order dated October 3, 1984 and that the husband had contracted a second marriage with one Seema daughter of Bimal Kumar of Ludhiana in the month of October, 1982 and that she was residing with him since then as the wife. It was further pleaded that the husband was unhappy at the performance of the marriage by the wife's parents although they had given adequate dowry. The husband asked her to bring more money from her parents and turned her out after giving beating. When information was sent about the birth of the daughter, none from the husband's family came to see her. Even efforts were made by her father to settle her in her husband's home, but he refused to do so; particularly when he had contracted a second marriage. It was under these circumstances that she was forced to live separately from her husband. In the replication, it was pleaded on the husband that the said Seema was the wife of Dhan Paul, his younger brother, and that she had given birth to two sons from that wedlock. The allegation made in the written statement that she was married to Hazari Lal were false and concocted. On the pleadings of the parties the trial Court framed the following issues : 1. Whether there is reasonable excuse for the respondent to withdraw from the society of the petitioner? 2. Relief. The learned trial Court found that the story of the second marriage by Hazari Lal with Meena was not proved and it was an invented story. According to the trial Court, the said Seema was married to Dhan Paul alias Dharm Paul, the younger brother of Hazari Lal. That being so, there was no reasonable excuse for the wife to withdraw from the society of her husband. Consequently, the decree for restitution of conjugal rights was passed.

(3.) THE learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that as a matter of fact, the petition for restitution of conjugal rights was filed as a counter -blast in view of the maintenance order passed under Section 125 of the Code and, therefore, it was liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. In support of this contention the learned counsel relied upon Gurdarshan Kaur alias Jaswant Kaur v. Jagrup Singh alias Bakshish Singh, 1987 Hindu Law Reporter 724. It was also contended that from the evidence on the record; particularly the letter, exhibit R.W. 8/A, dated November 4, 1982, it was proved that the husband Hazari Lal had contracted a second marriage with one Seema who was residing in that house and, therefore, there was a reasonable cause for appellant to live separately.