(1.) THE petitioner, who is the Editor and Publisher of a newspaper known as "Steel Town" at Gobindgarh, was accused of offence under Sections 499, 500 and 501 of the Indian Penal Code through a complaint filed by respondent Dev Raj Dhiman, who too is the Editor and Publisher of a weekly paper, namely, "Gobindgarh Steel Express". He was tried for those offences in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Fatehgarh Sahib, and the procedure followed concededly was that of a warrant case though the offences were triable as summon case. After examining the complainant's evidence, the trial Court dismissed the complaint vide its order dated December 14, 1985. This order was successfully assailed by the respondent through a revision petition in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala, who vide his order dated July 18, 1986, after setting aside the order of the trial Court, remanded the case for a fresh trial. What weighed with the learned Additional Sessions Judge was that the procedure adopted by the trial Court, i.e., of a warrant case, instead of a summons case, was palpably wrong and the dismissal of the complaint against the petitioner did not amount to anything more than his discharge. It is this order of the Additional Sessions Judge which is now impugned through this petition.
(2.) THE primary submission of Mr. Punia, learned Counsel for the petitioner, is that the order of the trial Magistrate dated December 14, 1985 amounted to acquittal of the accused of the charge levelled against him and he cannot be taken to have been discharged of that charge as has been assumed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. His submission is that had the case against the petitioner been tried as a summons case, the finding recorded by the trial Magistrate to the effect that the complainant had failed to establish the accusation against him, would have resulted in his acquittal and nothing else. Merely because the said Magistrate recorded the above noted finding while trying the case as a warrant case, cannot change his acquittal into mere discharge as has been held by the Additional Sessions Judge. I find merit in this stand of Mr. Punia. In exactly similar situation, this Court has already expressed the view in Raja Ram Trehan v. Principal, Sudarshan Singh, Malva Khalsa Higher Secondary School, Ferozepur City, 1981 Crl. L.J. 1469, that "order of discharge passed has to be read as an order of acquittal deemingly to have been passed under Section 255 of the Code and on that finding no revision was competent before the Additional Sessions Judge, Ferozepur and thus his order dated 30th August, 1980 is illegal and has to be quashed." I fully subscribe to the ratio of this judgment. All that has been said on behalf of the respondent is that the case having been tried as a warrant case, as a matter of fact, the order of the Magistrate could not be deemed to be an order acquittal and has rightly been taken to be an order of discharge by the Additional Sessions Judge. This submission has esentially to be rejected for all the reasons recorded in the above noted judgment in Raja Ram Tehran's case. Undisputeably the case was triable as a summons case and the procedure adopted, i.e., of a warrant case was patently illegal. That illegality cannot possibly go in favour of the respondent -complainant.
(3.) FOR the reasons stated above this petition is allowed and the impugned order of the Additional Sessions Judge, dated July 18, 1986 is set aside. The net result is that the petitioner stands acquitted of the charge levelled against him. Petition allowed.