BALKAR SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner has been detained under Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980, as per the order of the District Magistrate, Amritsar dated 12.8.1986 (Annexure P1). The material that satisfied the District Magistrate that it was necessary to detain the petitioner to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and security of the State, was that he had been arrested in a case, i.e. First Information Report No. 88 date 12th June, 1986, under Sections 384/596-125-A/153-A/148 of the Indian Penal Code, read with Sections 3/4 of the Terrorist and Disputive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 and Section 25 of the Arms Act. This factual aspect is so very clear from the grounds of detention (Annexure P-4) which were supplied to the petitioner at the time of service of the detention order. It is undisputed position that since the registration of this case, i.e. 12th June, 1986 the petitioner was in Jail.

(2.) IT is urged on behalf of the petitioner that in the light of the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah, AIR 1986 SC 315 and Binod Singh v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, AIR 1986 SC 2090, there was no justification for the District Magistrate to pass the impugned order, as the petitioner was already in custody for about two months prior to the passing of the said order. In order to counter this assertion, it is maintained by Shri Saron, the learned Assistant Advocate General that since there was only one case against the petitioner, it was likely that he could obtain his release on bail and keeping that likelihood in view, the District Magistrate was well justified in passing the impugned order. This submission of the learned counsel, however, does not impress me at all. I have already examined this aspect of the matter in an earlier case, i.e. Criminal Writ No. 592 of 1987, Ram Singh v. State of Punjab, 1987(2) R.C.R.(Criminal) 681, decided on 16.7.1987, wherein I have expressed the opinion that for offences under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 it is hardly possible for the accused to secure his release on bail. Even otherwise, I am of the view that in such a situation, it is for the State authorities to oppose the bail application filed by the accused and to go in appeal or move for its cancellation in case he is so ordered to be released. Their Lordships have categericatly ruled in the above noted judgments that if a man is in custody and there is no imminent possibility of his being released, the power of preventive detention should not be exercised. This is in spite of the howsoever disreputable antecedents a man may have. In the light of this, I find it difficult to sustain the impugned order. The same is, thus, set aside.