AMAR NATH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Vide F.I.R. No. 39 of February 2, 1979, a case under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, read with the Punjab Rice Bran (Distribution and Prevention) Control Order, 1978 (for short, the Control Order) was registered against the petitioners in Police Station, Kotwali, Bhatinda, at the instance of Jagir Singh, Assistant Food and Supplies Officer, Bhatinda. The crux of the allegations levelled in this report was that the said Assistant Food and Supplies Officer alongwith other members of the checking party, reached the outer gate of Roshan Lal Oil Mills, Mansa Road, Bhatinda, at 8.05 a.m. and found there eight trucks each loaded with 200 bags weighing about 100 quintals of husk (fuk) ready for delivery to the said mill. On examination it was found by the Field Analyst, Mr. Bhag Singh that as a matter of fact the above noted bags contained rice bran instead of husk as mentioned in the various documents and vochers available with the drives of those trucks. The case disclosed against the petitioners in a nut shell was that they were bringing or selling rice bran to the above noted mill, labelling it as husk and thereby violating the Control Order, which required all rice bran owners to sell the same to the Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation and to none else without a permit. Before the petitioners could be arrested and a result of the registeration of this case against them, they were granted anticipatory bails by different courts. Their case now is that since the date of the registration of the above noted case, nothing what so ever has been done by the authorities concerned to proceed against them in any Court of law and now after about 7-1/2 years, the police has chosen to put a report under Section 173, Cr.P.C. in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhatinda for trying them for the above noted offence alongwith other offences, i.e., under Sections 420/468, I.P.C. They seek the quashing of the above noted F.I.R. and the resultant proceedings which are now pending in the court of the C.J.M. It may be pointed out here that as yet some of the petitioners are being summoned as accused in that case.

(2.) The contention raised by Mr. H.L. Sibal, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners is that to allow the prosecution to proceed with the case at this belated stage, i.e. after about 7-1/2 years of the registration of the case against them, amounts to misuse of the process of the court. He also maintains that the offences under Sections 420/468 IPC have been added without any basis to simply cover up the delay that has been caused in launching the prosecution and to overcome the bar of limitation as laid in Section 368 Cr.P.C. The learned State counsel has neither filed any written reply to explain as to what the authorities concerned have been doing till now in not proceeding against the petitioners in any manner nor has he any explanation to offer. Having given my thoughtful consideration to the entire matter in the light of the submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties, I find that the petitioners must succeed.

(3.) It has recently been ruled by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court (Madheshwardhari Singh and another v. State of Bihar, 1986 CrLJ 1771) that the right of a speedy public trial is now an inalienable fundamental right of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution. It has further been ruled that a callous and inordinately prolonged delay of seven years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason) in investigation and original trial for offences other than capital ones plainly violates the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. The ratio of this judgment completely supports the case of the petitioners.