HARYANA STATE Vs. PUSA RAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal from the order of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Hissar (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal), dated Oct. 5, 1971, raises an interesting point of law as to whether a compensation claim for damage to property simpliciter can be entertained and adjudicated upon by the Tribunal under Section 110 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.

(2.) THE appellant--Haryana State preferred a claim application before the Tribunal for an amount of Rs. 3,000.00by way of compensation on the allegations that five buffaloes of the progeny Testing Farm, Hissar, owned by the State, were killed by rash and negligent driving of Truck No. HRH-7467 on Sept. 17, 1970 by Duli Chand driver.

(3.) MR . V. P. Gandhi, the learned counsel for the respondents, does not dispute that the proposition lid down in Smt. Jaswant Kaur's case ( (1970) 72 Pun LR 932) (supra) does not hold the field any more because of the amendment bought about in S. 110 by the Amending Act No. 56 of 1969. He, however, sought to sustain the order of the Tribunal on another ground that no claim application is competent by a third person who has not received any bodily injury. To substantiate this argument, the learned counsel referred to the provisions of S. 110--A (1) and contended that under sub--clause (a) which alone could possibly be invoked in the present case, the claim application is competent only by the person who has sustained bodily injury. The argument of the learned counsel seems to be that the word "injury" in sub--clause (a) means only the bodily injury and that unless a person making a claim for damage to property has also received bodily injury in the accident, no such claim would be maintainable. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on Farusbhai Altapbhai Saiyed v. Dullabhbhai Bhagabhai Patel 1973 Acc CJ 149: (AIR 1972 Guj 244) and B. S. Nat v. Bachan Singh 1971 Acc CJ 37: (AIR 1971 Punj 144) (supra ). In Farsubhai's case (supra) the provisions of S. 110--A (1) were interpreted prior to the amendment of S. 110 in the year 1969. On a combined reading of Ss. 110 (1) and 110--A (1), it was held that application before the Tribunal could be made only by a person who has sustained bodily injury and that the person who has suffered damage to his property as a result of the accident was not given the right to make such application. Prior to the amendment in the year 1969, the Tribunal had the jurisdiction only to adjudicate claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to the persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles and it was only by the Amending Act No. 56 of 1969 that the claims respecting damages to the property of a third party were made triable by the Tribunal. So this decision which was rendered prior to this amendment on the combined reading of S. 110 (1) and S. 110--A (1) is not of much help in the interpretation of the provisions of Clause (1) of S. 110--A. So far as B. S. Nath's case (supra) is concerned, what was relied upon by the learned counsel were some obiter dicta observations of C. G. Suri, J. according to which some corresponding amendments consequential have been made in S. 110 should have been made in the clauses of Section 110--A (1) which are supposed to give an exhaustive list of the categories of persons who can file application under the Act. There observations by the learned Judge can hardly be said to contain any expression of opinion on the interpretation of the provisions of Section 110--A (1) and, therefore, are also of no help.