JASWANT KAUR Vs. STATE OF HARYANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE writ petitions represent, perhaps, the final desperate attempt to stand up against the avalanche of land reforms initiated pursuant to the Directive Principles of State Policy. In these writ petitions, the vires of some of the provisions of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. 1972 (Act XXVI of 1972) is in question. The Act received the assent of the President on 22-12-1972 and was published in the Official Gazette on 23-12-1972. The Act was included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution on 7-9-1974, and, thereby, it came under the protective umbrella of Article 31-B of the Constitution and became immune from attack on the ground of inconsistency with or abridgement of any of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. However, on 9-9-1974, in Saroj Kumari v. State of Haryana, 1975 Pun LR 407 : (AIR 1975 Punj 353) a Division Bench of this Court, who apparently were unaware of the inclusion of the Act in the Ninth Schedule, struck down certain provisions of the Act on the ground that those provisions offended the rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. They held that the provisions were also not saved by Article 31-A of the Constitution as those provisions which mainly related to "family Unit", could not be said to be in furtherance of Clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution. The Division Bench placed reliance on the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Sucha Singh Bajwa v. State of Punjab, 1974-76 Pun LR 273 : (AIR 1974 Punj 162) (FB), where similar provisions of the Punjab Land Reforms Act had been struck down. The decision of the Full Bench in Sucha Singh Bajwa v. State of Punjab has since been reversed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1040 of 1976 : (reported in AIR 1977 SC 915 ). The Supreme Court has held that the provisions of the Punjab Land Reforms Act are saved both by Article 31-A and Article 31-B of the Constitution. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court and in view of the. circumstances that the Division Bench did not notice the inclusion of the Haryana Act in the Ninth Schedule, the decision in Saroj Kumari v. State of Haryana cannot any longer be considered to be good law. But, it was argued by Shri Anand Swaroop that the Haryana Act was unworkable as some of its provisions were vague and mutually inconsistent. He submitted that such provisions as were vague, inconsistent and, therefore, unworkable should be struck down and that neither Article 31-A nor Article 31-B of the Constitution would save such provisions. He drew our attention to the fact that in Saroj Kumari's case, the Division Bench, in addition to holding that the provisions of the Act offended the rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution, also gave the following additional reason for striking down the provisions of the Haryana Act:-

(2.) IN India, where we do not have a 'due process' clause in the Constitution as in the United States of America, it is unthinkable that a law enacted by the legislature, which it has the power to enact, which does not offend any of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution and which does not contravene any other provision of the Constitution, can be declared ultra vires either on the ground that the provisions of the statute are vague or on the ground that they are mutually inconsistent. In Amritsar Municipality v. State of Punjab, AIR 1969 SC 1100, dealing with the observations of the Punjab High Court that legislation which was 'vague, uncertain and ambiguous' had to be struck down, the Supreme Court said:-" But the rule that an Act of a competent legislature may be 'struck down' by the Courts on the ground of vagueness is alien to our constitutional system. The Legislature of the State of Punjab was competent to enact legislation in respect of 'fairs', vide Entry 28 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. A law may be declared invalid bv the supreior Courts in India if the Legislature has no power to enact the law or that the law violates any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or is inconsistent with any constitutional provisions, but not on the ground that it is vague. It is true that in Claude C, Connally v. General Construction Co. , (1926) 70 Law Ed 322 it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States of America that:

(3.) AGAIN , where the provisions of a statute appear to be mutually inconsis-tent, there are several well-known rules of interpretation to guide the Court in giving a proper meaning to the provisions of a statute. There is firstly the principle of harmonious construction according to which the Court should seek to avoid any conflict in the provisions of a statute by endeavouring to harmonise and reconcile every part so that each shall be effective. There are then other rules such as the special shall prevail over the general, the last shall prevail over the earlier, an amendment shall prevail over the original etc. With the aid of such and kindred rules of interpretation, the Court must ascertain the true legislative intent and apply it to the situation before it. The Judge cannot shrug his shoulders and remain placidly content with the observation that the provisions are irreconcilable.