DILBAG RAI Vs. SMT. LAJWANTI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a revision petition challenging the order of the Rent Controller dated the 11th April, 1977, by which the petition by the present petitioner under section 18 -B(4) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh was dismissed.

(2.) SMT . Lajwanti (hereinafter to be called the respondent) filed an application under section 13 -A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as amended by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Chandigarh Amendment) Ordinance, 1976, thereinafter to be called the Act) for eviction of Shri Dilbag Rai (hereinafter to be called the petitioner) from first floor of the premises in dispute. The ground of eviction according to the averments in the petition was that the husband of the respondent was an employee of the Chandigarh Administration and had been allotted Government accommodation as such but had to vacate the same under the directions of the Central Government on the ground that he owned a building in Chandigarh in the name of his wife. It was further averred that the husband of the respondent was entitled to IX type Government accommodation comprising of drawing room, dining room 3 bed rooms, one kitchen, two bath rooms, laterine and one barsati. The respondent was in occupation of the ground floor but the same was not sufficient for the family which consisted of 9 members including four sons and three daughters. Consequent to the notice of this application the petitioner filed an application under section 18 -B(4) of the Act, seeking leave to contest the application. This application was rejected by the impugned order.

(3.) IT is not disputed that the husband of the respondent is an employee of the Chandigarh Administration i.e., Central Government, that he was allotted a Government accommodation and that after the coming into force of the new Rules regarding Government accommodation he had vacated the same on 20th January, 1977. It is contended that the application under section 13 -A of the Act is maintainable only if it is submitted by an employee of the Central Government himself as a landlord. In the present case the respondent was the landlord of the petitioner and not her husband and respondent was not an employee of the Central Government. A close perusal of section 13 -A (1) as reproduced above clearly shows that the landlord for the purpose of this provision is one who not only owns house in his own name but also if he owns residential or a scheduled building in the Union Territory of Chandigarh in the name of his wife or dependent child. Thus the definition of landlord has been extended. If any other interpretation is adopted then the words, "that he owns, in the Union Territory of Chandigarh, a residential or a scheduled building either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child" will have to be read as non -existent or having been deleted. This cannot be done according to the well settled principles of interpretation of statutes. We must proceed with the presumption that every word or expression in the provision was incorporated by the Legislature deliberately and with a purpose. Besides, if the interpretation as suggested by the Learned Counsel is adopted the result will be that an employee of the Central Government will be deprived of Government accommodation on the ground that his wife or dependant was having an accommodation of his own but the employee will not be able to get the premises vacated. The clear purpose and intention of the New Rules regarding Government accommodation is that those Government employees who have residential accommodation of their own whether in their own name or in the name or their wives or dependent children must vacate the Government accommodation and occupy their own premises so that the Government accommodation falling vacant may be available to those who need the same. This laudable object will be defeated if restricted meaning is given to section 13 -A (1) of the Act as stressed by the Learned Counsel. Tilak Ram's case (supra) does lend support to the contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner wherein section 14 -A (1) of the Delhi Act 18 of 1976, which is in pari materia with section 13 -A (1) of the Act has been interpreted. From the perusal of the judgment it appears that pointed attention was not drawn to the words "that he owns a residential accommodation, either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child". Keeping in view the scheme of the provision, namely, section 13 -A and the purpose of the Rules of the Government regarding Government accommodation, I am not persuaded to subscribe to the view in the above mentioned judgment.