GIAN DASS Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Civil Writ Petition No. 6002 of 1976 came up before me on May 5, 1977. The point raised was that the petitioners who are landless workers had approached the Government for acquisition of land to be allotted to them for building their residential houses. Since it was done and possession was given to them, and the landlord being an influential person had succeeded in getting the notification of the acquisition rescinded by the Government, it was urged that the notification cancelling the earlier notification should be quashed by this Court as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagawat and others, 1975 AIR(SC) 1967 I accepted this prayer presumably because Mr. Bahl says that he was a little late in coming to this Court and could not bring the correct translation of Annexure P/2 attached to the petition, to my notice. Later on, Mohan Lal filed C.W.P. No. 1500 of 1977 which came up for motion hearing before me and my learned brother S.S. Sidhu, J. In that case it was asserted that since the substance of the notification had not been published in the locality, the acquisition should be quashed. This prayer was opposed on the basis of my judgment dated May 5, 1977, given in this case and it was contended that since the notification cancelling the acquisition proceedings had been quashed, the acquisition stood intact and could not be set aside in a subsequent litigation. That case was argued at some length and was adjourned to September 8, 1977 at the request of Mr. Bahl who wanted to file a review petition against my order which is now before me.

(2.) When a learned counsel of Mr. Bahl's standing states that he was not present in the Court when I gave the earlier judgment, I have to accept his statement and indeed if it had not been established that the possession of the land had been given to various landless workers, I would not have issued the earlier writ. Though Mr. Bahl had filed a written statement and with that written statement, he filed a correct copy of Rapat Roznamcha (Annexure R/3) but that escaped my notice. Mr Bahl today argued that the petitioner filed a wrong translation of Annexure P/2 (Rapat Roznamcha) which led me to commit this error that the possession of land had been given to the landless workers. I requested Mr. H.L. Sarin to pass on the document to me on the basis of which his office made this translation. That document has been shown to me and it purports to be certified by Mr. M.L. Sarin Advocate. This document itself does not show that the authorities of the State Government had taken actual possession of land. Since I was led to issue the writ on the basis of a document which had not been properly translated, I think it is a fit case in which I should rectify my own error and withdraw the writ issued. Mr. H.L. Sarin, the learned counsel has raised an objection that since a L.P.A. has been filed against my judgment, it is not open to me to exercise powers of review under Order 47 Rule 1 of C.P.C. I do not agree with this submission. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court does on occasions rely upon the principles contained in the C.P.C. But the rigid provisions of that Code have never stood in the way of this Court to do substantial justice between the parties. As I said earlier, I my self acted in haste because I did not wait for Mr. Bahl. In these circumstances, if I do not rectify my own mistake, the injustice done to an innocent litigant would continue to stare him in the face. Even otherwise, in Shivdev Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, 1963 AIR(SC) 1909 it has been settled by the highest authority of Supreme Court that a Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is competent to review its own orders. For the reasons mentioned above, I withdraw my order dated May 5, 1977 and order that this case should also come up for hearing alongwith C.W.P. No. 1500/1977 which is fixed for motion hearing on September 8, 1977. The parties are left to bear their own costs of these proceedings.