SATISH BINDRA Vs. SURJIT SINGH BINDRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition for revision of the order of the Court of Shri Baldev Singh, subordinate Judge First Class, Jullundur, dated Sept. 9. 1976, under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act (25 of 1955) (hereinafter called the Act) allowing the petitioner a sum of Rs. 80 as litigation expenses and Rs. 50 per mensem as maintenance pendente lite during the pendency of the respondent's petition under Section 9 of the Act. The learned counsel for the husband raises a preliminary objection to the effect that the order passed by the trial Court under Section 24 of the Act is appealable under Section 28 thereof, and, therefore the revision petition cannot be entertained. There is no doubt that section 28 of the original Act provided that all decrees or orders passed by the court in any proceeding under the Act would be appealable but by Section 19 of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, the following section has been substituted in place of original Section 28:--

(2.) SO far as the merits of the petition are concerned, suffice it to say that the learned Subordinate Judge has, after reproducing the contentions of the parties and stating that the petitioner claimed Rs. 700 per mensem as maintenance expenses and Rs. 1,500 as litigation expenses and after taking notice of the defence of the husband to the effect that the petitioner had means to. maintain herself, straightway passed the order in the following' terms:-

(3.) MR. Gurbachan Singh, who appears for the petitioners, has laid particular emphasis on the fact that a copy of an agreement executed earlier between the parties was on the record of the case before the trial Court in which the husband had agreed to pay to the petitioner Rs. 700 per mensem on account of maintenance. The factum of the copy of the agreement being on the record of the trial Court is denied by the learned counsel for the husband. Be that as it may, it is clear that the trial Court has not passed any order in accordance with law on the application of the petitioner. If the averments of the petitioner contained in her affidavit were not considered enough, she should have been afforded an opportunity to give supplementary affidavit or affidavits on any point required by the Court or if the Court so required even to lead evidence in the course of a summary inquiry, at the end of which proper order should have been passed. Since the order is not supported by any reason and does not discuss the pros and cons of the rival versions of the parties relating to the quantum of income of the husband, I have to set aside the order of the trial court. I need not refer to the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner relating to the quantum of maintenance allowance or the litigation expenses which should be allowed in such cases in connection with which he has referred to the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Mrs Arti Singh v. Kanwar Pal Singh, (1976) 78 Pun LR (D) 268 : (AIR 1977 Delhi 76), and the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Usha v. Sudhir, ILR (1973) 2 Punj and Har 248. It is for the trial Court to hear the parties on the question of quantum of litigation expenses and maintenance and to pass an appropriate order.