SANTA SINGH Vs. THE STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE appellant Santa Singh, was originally convicted by the learned Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, on two counts of murder and was sentenced to death on February 26, 1975. The convictions as well as the sentence of death were confirmed by the High Court on September 11, 1975. Santa Singh preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court confirmed the convictions but accepted the appeal in regard to sentence on the ground that the trial Judge had not conformed to the mandatory requirements of section 235 (2) of 1973 Criminal Procedure Code. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial Court, directing that court to comply with the provisions of section 235(2) and to pass sentence in accordance with law. That was on August 17, 1976. Thereafter, the learned Sessions Judge heard the appellant on the question of sentence and, on September 28, 1976, once again imposed the sentence of death. The learned Sessions Judge observed that there were an extenuating circumstances. He also said "Murder is a crime of the blackest dye which calls for punishment without pity". He added that it was specially so where "the lives of two innocent persons were taken away by the accused most brutally". The circumstances that a long time had elapsed since he was first sentenced to death was met with the statement. "True, he has undergone lot of mental agony and torture during the period that has elapsed since he was sentenced to death by this Court February 26, 1976 up to this day, but for this the accused has to thank himself."

(2.) IN our view, the comments of the learned Sessions Judge that murder always called for punishment without pity and that if the accused was not hanged earlier he had to thank himself betray an insensitivity to the gradual change of legislative and judicial attitudes in recent years. Apart from the increasing emphasis on correctional sentencing processes, in the matter of imposition of an appropriate sentence for murder, there has been a swinging of the pendulum from one end to the other. Section 302, Indian Penal Code, prescribes either of two sentences for murder, death or imprisonment for life. Before 1955, section 367(5) of the old Criminal Procedure Code enjoined a duty on the Court to record its reasons if it awarded the sentence of Imprisonment for life. That meant that death was to be treated as the normal sentence for murder. Section 367(5) was deleted by an Amending Act in 1953. The result was that death ceased to be narmal sentence for murder and the Court was free to exercise its direction according to the circumstances of the case. Now section 354 of the 1973 Criminal Procedure Code enjoins a duty on the Court to state "special reasons" for imposing the sentence of death. Imprisonment for life and not death is now to be considered the normal sentence for murder and it can no longer be argued that the penalty of death must be imposed in the absence of extenuating circumstances. On the other hand, the sentence of death cannot now be imposed in the absence of exceptional circumstances justifying the extreme penalty. The search despatch, for that very reason, fails to relieve the victim from condemnation to detain the learned judge then referred to the legislative and penological trends and summarised "the positive indicators against death sentence under Indian Law currently ". One of the 'indicators' so mentioned by the learned Judge was as follows: - -

(3.) Thus, the prolonged darkness of the months of waiting after the imposition of the sentence of death has always been considered by Courts to be a relevant factor in deciding whether that sentence should not be substituted by a sentence of imprisonment for life. In the instant case, we have the additional circumstance that the appellant had been brooding for several years over the Karewa union (common law marriage) of his mother and Bachan Singh (the two deceased) which he apparently resented very much. It is also in evidence that he was taunted by the residents of the village about the Karewa marriage between his mother and Bachan Singh and that he was unable to stand the taunts. In the background of these circumstances, we think that the passage of time must tilt the balance in favour of life imprisonment. We accordingly set aside the sentence of death and instead impose the sentence of imprisonment for life, on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. The reference is rejected and the appeal is accepted on the question of sentence.