SHRI RATTAN CHAND JAIN Vs. SHRI CHARAN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondent landlord filed a petition under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (hereinafter called the Act) for ejectment of Rattan Chand petitioner from the house in dispute situate at Chandigarh on the grounds on non-payment of arrears of rent and personal necessity. The petitioner contested the petition and tendered arrears of rent together with interest which were duly accepted by the landlord. Thereafter the only dispute which subsisted between the parties was the alleged personal requirement of the landlord. The Rent Controller, after going through the evidence produced the parties, negatived the plea of personal necessity and dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Appellate Authority, recalled the landlord, recorded this detailed statement to clarify certain averments concerning his personal requirement to occupy the demised premises and reversed the finding of the trial Court. Consequently, the plea of the landlord was upheld and the ejectment of the petitioner ordered. Aggrieved by that Judgment, the tenant has filed this petition under section 15(5) of the Act.

(2.) At the outset, the learned counsel for the petitioner, challenged the propriety and legality of the order recalling the landlord for recording his statement by the Appellate Authority. No doubt, sub section (3) of Section 15 of the Act, the Appellate Authority to make such further enquiry as it thinks fit, yet according to the learned counsel this provision cannot be invoked to fill the gaps in the evidence produced by the landlord to substantiate his plea of personal necessity. It was further contended that though the provisions of Order 41, rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure, may not be strictly applicable to cases under the Act but still while granting a prayer of this kind, the principles which guide the Courts in accepting an application of that nature have to be borne in mind by the Appellate Authority. Reliance for this contention was placed on a decision of this Court in Bishan Dass and others v. Kehar Singh & another, 1972 AIR(P&H) 263. The contention of the learned counsel appears to be well merited. The Appellate Authority, on perusal of the statement of the landlord, found that it was vague as he did not explain as to when the Panchayat elections were held; how his family consisted of nine members; what was the nature of his represented illness and what were the portions of his house which had been admitted by him to have fallen vacant and relet by him when those portions fell vacant. For proper decision and doing justice between the parties, it was though proper by the Appellate Authority to record the supplementary statement of the landlord. I am afraid if it the power under section 15(3) of the Act can be invoked to fill in gaps in the evidence of the landlord so as to make out a case for his personal necessity. The landlord having been afforded full opportunity to lead his evidence, the Appellate Authority, as held in Bishan Dass's case will not be entitled to allow the additional evidence except on principles similar to those contained in Order 41 rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure Supplementary by the statement of the landlord was recorded Appellate Authority in this case for a proper decision and doing justice between the parties but as a matter of fact this was done only to fill in gaps in the evidence of the landlord as is evident from its observations noticed above. There was, therefore, no justifiable ground for recording supplementary statement of the landlord in this case.

(3.) Apart from the legal infirmity noticed above, the finding of the lower Appellate Court is liable to be reversed on two other grounds also, namely, that the finding is based on facts which were never pleaded in the application and were only introduced at the stage of evidence and that the lower Appellate Court failed to instruct itself properly as to the meaning of the words, "requires for his own occupation". As regards the first ground, the only averment made in this respect by the landlord was that he required medical aid in Chandigarh and had been advised to live in an open locality. There was no averment that some of his grandchildren were residing with him in the village and he intended to shift to Chandigarh as it provided better educational facilities, whereas, the Appellate Authority was impressed to a large extent by this fact while determining bonafide needs of the landlord to occupy the demised premises. Rule of law is well established that no amount of evidence can be looked into on a matter, the foundation for which has not been laid first in the pleadings. The Appellate Authority, therefore, fell into error of law in taking into consideration the requirement of the alleged members of the family of the landlord while determining his personal necessity. The words "his own occupation" no doubt have been consistently interpreted to mean occupation by the landlord and his dependents but the grand-children of the landlord in this case can hardly be said to be members of his family dependant upon him. Their need, therefore, could not be taken into consideration while determining the personal necessity of the landlord to occupy the demises premises.