SUNDAR DASS Vs. GURPARTAP DASS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a plaintiff's petition for revision of the order of Shri H. R. Nohria, Subordinate Judge First Class, Amritsar, dated Oct. 16, 1976, deciding the preliminary issue about the valuation of the suit for purposes of court--fee. The plaintiff originally filed a suit for a declaration to the effect that he is the Mahant Gaddi Nashin Akhara Ghamanda Dass alias Beriwala, and is as such entitled to manage its affairs and release rents and profits of the immovable property with permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering in the management of the Akhara and realising rent from the tenants of the Akhara in the shops (the underlined portions were later omitted from the amended plaint ).

(2.) THE plaintiff had valued the original suit for purposes of court--fee and jurisdiction at Rs. 130/ -. The defendant joined issue with the plaintiff about the said valuation. Shri S. K. Chopra, Subordinate Judge First Class, Amritsar, by his order, dated April 18, 1975, deciding that issue, held that the suit is governed by S. 7 (iv) (c) of the Court--fees Act, 1870 (hereinafter called the Act) and that by virtue of the second proviso added thereto by the Punjab amendment, the valuation of the suit for purposes of court-fee is to be worked out under clause (v) of S. 7. Not satisfied with the order of the trial Court, the plaintiff came up to this Court for revision thereof in Civil Revision No. 765 of 1975. The revision petition was dismissed by this Court (Verma, J.) on Feb. 10, 1976. While dismissing the petition, the learned Judge made it clear that whatever had been said in his order was limited to the disposal of the revision petition, but would not affect the situation which may arise by any amendment of the plaint that may be made by the plaintiff thereafter.

(3.) GOOD deal of arguments have been addressed by Mr. R. S. Bindra, the learned Senior Advocate for the plaintiff--petitioner, but all those arguments are based on the assumption that the suit is governed by S. 7 (iv) (c ). All those arguments are directed towards showing that notwithstanding the finding that the suit is governed by S. 7 (iv) (c) the second proviso thereto has no application to the case as the reliefs claimed in this suit are not "with reference to any property" and further that in fact no "property" is involved in this suit.