TIRATH RAM CHADDA Vs. TARA SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The only ground on which this petition against the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority directing the eviction of the petitioner was admitted was that the landlord had neither alleged nor proved the three requirements of section 13(2) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (3 of 1949) as eviction had been sought and allowed on the ground of personal requirement of the premises by treating them as residential. This was noticed in the order of admission passed by me on December 22, 1976. Since mentioned of the Full Bench decision had been made in the order of admission and the Full Bench decision in Shri Banke Ram v. Smt. Sarasti Devi, 1977 RCR(Civ) 595, related to the requirement to mention the ingredients of sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause (i) of section 13 (3)(a) of the Act, the landlord made an application (C. M. 102/C-II of 1977) for dismissing the petition on the short ground that all the three ingredients in question had been specifically mentioned in Paragraph 5(iv) of the petition. The tenant has filed a reply to that application. The correct admitted position that has emerged is that though all the ingredients were not mentioned in the original position, those were mentioned in the amended petition filed by the landlord-respondent before the Rent Controller. It had been stated in the amended petition "that the applicant require the premises for his own use and occupation; the applicant is not occupying any other residential building in the urban area of Chandigarh; and that he has not vacated any building after the commencement of this Act in the said area of Chandigarh." Mr. Harbhagwan Singh, learned Counsel for the tenant petitioner, has submitted that the error in pointing out this non-existent ground was due to the fact that his client had handed over to him only a copy of the original petition for eviction and not of the amended petition.

(2.) The only ground that has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner at the hearing of the petition today is that the landlord had not specifically pleaded in the application for eviction that the building was residential, and inasmuch as no specific plea to that effect had been taken no amount of evidence in support of such a plea should be looked into. Relevant part of section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act reads :-

(3.) The last submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that an order for eviction can relate only to the first-floor which is used for residence and not to the shop. I do not find any force in this submission as the tenancy cannot be split up for the purpose of passing an order for eviction and any such suggestion would be contrary to the scheme for the Act as envisaged in the definitions of residential and non-residential building referred to above.