SMT. MALAN DEVI Vs. PIARA LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) An application for eviction of respondent No. 1 from some premises under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, was made by the petitioner on April 16, 1973. The ground of eviction taken therein was the non-payment of arrears of rent from January 21, 1956 up to the date of filing of the application. The respondent putting in his appearance on the first date of hearing, tendered rent as demanded for the period from January 21, 1956 to June 21, 1973, with interest and costs and the eviction application was dismissed by the Rent Controller on May 29, 1973. Subsequently, an application for prosecution of the petitioner under Sections 205 and 210, Indian Penal Code, was made by the respondent in the court of the Judicial Magistrate on June 5, 1973, which was dismissed on May 8, 1975. Thereafter, an application out of which the present revision petition has arisen, was made on June 6, 1975, by the respondent with a prayer that he was forced to make double payment of rent for the period from January 21, 1956 to June 21, 1967, to the petitioner on the basis of deliberate false averment in the eviction application that the rent for the said period had not been paid though in fact, the rent for this period had been already paid by the respondent. It was averred that the double payment was made by the respondent in order to save himself from eviction from the premises in his occupation as a tenant. In reply two preliminary objections were raised. One that the Rent Controller in whose court the double payment had been made was not a court under Section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 hereinafter called the old Code, and second that the said application was not maintainable under the old Code and under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (hereinafter called the new Code), as the Rent Controller at the time of dismissing the eviction application did not pass the requisite order for prosecution of the petitioner. Both these preliminary objections were not agreed to and the impugned order was passed. It may be clarified here that as yet, the Rent Controller has not passed any final order on merit. This order has been challenged in the present revision petition.

(2.) The learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the impugned order on these very two grounds referred to above. The contention has no substance. Admittedly, the alleged double payment of rent, on the basis of false averments in the eviction application, had been made by the respondent before the Rent Controller in the eviction application. According to the learned counsel the Rent Controller is not a court and, therefore, the petition under Section 476 read with Section 195 of the old Code is not maintainable. The Rent Controller has been held to be a court for the purpose of Sub-section (2) to Section 195 of the old Code by a Full Bench of this Court in Shrimati Vidya Devi v. Firm Madan Lal Prem Kumar, 1971 AIR(P&H) 150 This Sub-section (2) has been reproduced in Sub-section (3) to Section 195 in the new Code. So far as the present case is concerned, the amended provision has no relevance. Rather, the amendment has made the provision more comprehensive. According to Sub-section (2) to Section 195 of the old Code, proceedings could be initiated when the offence mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) to Section 195 had been committed before any civil, revenue or criminal court, but in Sub-section (3) to Section 195 of the new Code, besides civil, revenue and criminal court, the term "court" has also been defined to include a tribunal which may be declared as a court by the relevant statute for the purpose of the Section. In view of the decision by the Full Bench in Shrimati Vidya Devi's case , the Rent Controller is a Court and, therefore, Section 195 whether of the old or the new Code, is fully applicable to the present case.

(3.) The second contention that as the Rent Controller did not think it fit to pass any order regarding the prosecution of the petitioner at the time of the disposing of the eviction application therefore, this application was not maintainable, is also misconceived. The relevant provision which is applicable to the facts of the present case is Section 476 of the old Code which is equivalent to Section 340 of the new Code. According to the same, a petition can be made under the said provision at any time subsequent to the order of the authority or the Court disposing of the proceedings, in question. The bar as embodied in Section 479-A of the old Code, which is equivalent to Section 344 of the new Code, is not operative in the proceedings under Section 476 of the old Code.