WARYAM SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts relevant for deciding this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution do not appear to be disputed. Including an increase of 15-3/4 units in the value, on account of the improvements made in the original holding of the petitioners as indicated in the Khasra Girdawari of Kharif 1956, the petitioner owned 39 standard acres 12-3/4 units of agricultural land. On account of additional irrigation facilities which became subsequently available, there was a further enhancement in area measuring 3 standard acres. This was the situation in which the Collector (Agrarian Reforms), Sangrur, passed his order, dated November 1, 1961 (Annexure 'A') declaring 6 standard acres 1-1/2 units of land as the petitioner's surplus area after allowing him the permissible area of 30 standard acres. It is recorded in the order of the Collector that the learned counsel for the petitioner conceded at that time that the basis on which the surplus area had been declared was correct. On the enforcement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment and Validation) Act (16 of 1962) (hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act), section 32-NN was added to the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (13 of 1955) (hereinafter called the Principal Act). Section 10 of the Amending Act by which section 32-NN was added to the Principal Act was given retrospective effect by sub-section (2) of section 1 of the Amending Act which provides that the said section shall be deemed to have come into force on the 30th of October, 1956. This necessarily meant that the order of the Collector, dated November 1, 1961, had to be brought in accord with the provisions of section 32-NN in appropriate proceedings as section 32-NN was deemed to have been enforced by fiction of law before the date on which the Collector disposed of the proceedings. It is admitted by the petitioner that no fault could be found with the order of the Collector (Annexure 'A'), if the law had not been changed retrospectively. It is also not disputed that the order of the Collector was passed under sub-section (2) of section 32-D of the Principal Act and that though an appeal against that order lay under sub-section (2) of that section, no such remedy was availed of by the petitioner. After the coming into force of the Amending Act, the petitioner filed an application for revision before the Commissioner on July 19, 1963 (copy Annexure 'B'), which was returned to him by the order of the Commissioner, dated July 23, 1963, on the ground that the revision petition did not lie before the Commissioner. The same petition was then presented by the petitioner to the Financial Commissioner alongwith an application dated July 31, 1963 (Annexure 'C') and the only relief sought in the said petition related to the consequences of the retrospective operation of section 32-NN. When the revision petition came up for hearing before Shri E.N. Mangat Rai, Financial Commissioner, Development, Punjab, he dismissed the same by his order, dated October 2, 1963 (Annexure 'D') on the solitary ground that the petition was time-barred and that the reasons given by the petitioner for the delay were not satisfactory. The solitary reason which appears to have been relied upon for the delay before the Financial Commissioner was that the principles of evaluation of land contained in section 32-NN of the Act were not available at the time when the Collector's order was passed and they had been enforced subsequently with retrospective effect. This was not considered by the Financial Commissioner to be a sufficient ground because the revision petition had been filed in July, 1963, that is about a year after the passing of the Amending Act. In the writ petition the grievance of the petitioner is that the Financial Commissioner was in error in thinking that there was any period of limitation prescribed by law for approaching him in revision. This is the alleged error of law apparent on the face of the record which has brought the petitioner to this Court.

(2.) Sub-section (4) of section 32-D confers on the State Government power of suo motu calling for any record relating to the draft statement. No limitation is prescribed for the exercise of the said power by the State Government. A general power of revision in respect of all matters dealt with under the Principal Act, as subsequently amended, has been conferred on the Financial Commissioner subject to the limitation that the power to be exercised by him is the same as provided under section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act (16 of 1887) (hereinafter called the Tenancy Act). Sections 32-D(2), (3) and (4), and section 39(3) may be quoted at this stage :-

(3.) The argument of Mr. Gopal Singh, the learned Advocate-General for the State of Punjab, is that the words "under the law for the time being in force" in sub-section (5) of section 84 of the Tenancy Act have reference to all the laws in force at the relevant time including the law of limitation. That being so, it is contended on behalf of the respondents, the limitation provided for a petition for revision under the Code of Civil Procedure was applicable to the petition for revision filed by the petitioner before the Financial Commissioner. I am unable to agree with this contention. It is conceded by the learned counsel for respondents that no specific period of limitation for a petition for revision to the Financial Commissioner either under section 32-D(4) or under section 39(3) is provided under the principal Act, and that but for inviting the applicability of the limitation of time by the above-mentioned interpretation of sub-section (5) of section 84 of the Tenancy Act, the Financial Commissioner would have been in error in dismissing the revision petition on the ground of its being barred by time. Expression "under the law for the time being in force" in sub-section (5) of section 84 refers, in my opinion, to the grounds contained in the Code of Civil Procedure on which the High Court can interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction and not to the other laws for the time being in force which do not relate to scope of revisional jurisdiction. There is no doubt that in the absence of any prescribed period of limitation, the revisional authority has to exercise its discretion according to sound judicial principles for declining in appropriate cases to entertain a petition for revision on the ground that it is inordinately delayed. But in this particular case, the learned Financial Commissioner seems to have dismissed the petitioner's application under the erroneous impression that a specific period of limitation had been prescribed by law which had already expired. Moreover, in the circumstances of this case, it was the duty of the authorities to bring the Collector's order, dated November 1, 1961, in accord with the provisions of section 32NN introduced by the Amending Act which provisions had in the wisdom of the Legislature been given retrospective effect. If after the coming into force of the Amending Act, the authorities declined to give effect to its provisions on the ground that the remedy sought by an aggrieved person was barred by time, it would render sub-section (2) of section 1 of the Amending Act nugatory. I have already held in Nasib Singh v. The State of Punjab and others,1966 LLT(RR) 185 that the Collector cannot review his own orders as no such authority is conferred on him by the statute. The only possible remedy which the petitioner could, therefore, seek for enforcing his legal right of obtaining benefits available to him under section 32-NN was by approaching the Financial Commissioner in revision. The Financial Commissioner was bound to give effect to the law as indicated by the Legislature and could not create a bar in the way of the petitioner which had not been imposed by any statute. In these circumstances I think that the learned Financial Commissioner was in clear error of law in declining to entertain the application of the petitioner on the ground of its being barred by time. Relief to the petitioner having been declined on that ground alone, I have no hesitation in setting aside and quashing the impugned order and directing the Financial Commissioner to hear and dispose of the petitioner's application for revision on merits in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs.