LAKHI RAM Vs. THE GRAM PANCHAYAT GUDAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE only question argued by Shri Amrit Lal Bahri the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff -Appellant in this appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing his Regular Second Appeal and maintaining the decree of affirmance of the first Appellate Court dismissing the suit of the Plaintiff for a permanent injunction to restrain the Respondent Gram Panchayat from interfering with the possession of the Appellant over the disputed ghair (marked ABCD in the plan attached to the plaint), which is a part of the abadi deh of the village, relates to the question of retrospectively of Sub -section (1) of Section 3 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act (18 of 1961) (hereinafter referred to as the 1961 Act).

(2.) ON the issue of a notice by the Defendant -Respondent (hereinafter referred to as the Panchayat) under Section 21 of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952, the Appellant filed the suit from which the present appeal has arisen on the ground that the ghair in dispute belonged to him and was in his possession and was not situated on any thorough fare or public place. The alternative plea on which the Plaintiff's claim was based was to the effect that the property in question formed part of the public site of which the Plaintiff was entitled to continue to be in possession as a biswedar in the village. The main ground on which the suit was contested by the Panchayat was that the site in dispute vested in it as it was a part of a public thoroughfare and a public place. The first issue framed in the case about the Plaintiff being the exclusive owner of the site in dispute has been decided against the Appellant at all stages and no more arises in this appeal. On the second issue it was found by the trial Court that a biswedar could not take possession of the public site as it was being used as a thoroughfare. In Plaintiff's appeal against the dismissal of the suit by the trial Court it was held by the first Appellate Court that a particular portion of the site formed part of the abadi deh and was as such a public place which had Vested in the Grani Panchayat. Regarding the ghair in dispute it was held that it was a part of the abadi deh and any biswedar of the village was entitled to occupy it. The decree of the lower Court dismissing the suit was, however, maintained even in respect of the ghair on the ground that the Appellant had failed to prove that he was in possession of the property in question. In the second Appeal before a learned Single Judge of this Court it was argued on behalf of the Appellant that once the site in question had been found to be a part of the abadi deh and the Appellant was held to be a biswedar in the village, the site could not, according to law, vest in the Panchayat, and, therefore, the Panchayat had no jurisdiction to issue any notice to the Appellant under Section 21 of the Gram Panchavat Act. for the demolition of the structures made by the Appellant on the said site. The fate of the second appeal depended, and so does the fate of this Letters Patent Appeal, on the question whether the abadi deh land in dispute had or had not vested in the Panchayat at the time of the issue of the notice under Section 21 of the Gram Panchayat Act. The relevant law in force at that time was admittedly the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act (1 of 1954) (hereinafter called the 1954 Act). The Plaintiff's second appeal was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on the ground that though the land in question could not have vested in the Panchayat under the 1954 Act itself, it so vested by operation of Sections 3 and 4 of the 1961 Act with retrospective effect. The definition of shamilat deh in Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act was held to govern even the pre -1961 cases which had arisen after the coming into force of the 1954 Act. An additional argument advanced on behalf of the Panchayat to the effect that the suit for permanent injunction was barred under Section 56 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 as proceedings under Section 21 of the Gram Panchayat Act fell within the category of criminal cases, was negatived by the learned Single Judge. The Plaintiff haying thus been unsuccessful in his second appeal has come up in this further appeal to the Division Bench on a certificate granted by the learned Single Judge.

(3.) (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any agreement, instrument, custom or usage or any decree or order of any Court or other authority all rights title and interests whatever in the land -