(1.) DEFENDANT Jit Singh has filed this Regular Second Appeal against the judgments and decree passed by both the courts below, whereby suit of the respondent-plaintiff has been decreed for the recovery of Rs. 99,000/- along with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of execution of the pronote Ex.P1 and receipt Ex.P2 till the date of decree and at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of decree till the realization of the principal sum.
(2.) IN this written statement, the appellant-defendant took the stand that he neither borrowed any amount from the respondent-plaintiff nor executed any pronote and receipt in his favour. It was averred that the alleged pronote and receipt are forged and fabricated documents, which do not bear signatures of the appellant-defendant. It was also pleaded that plaintiff Jagroop Singh (now deceased) was not in a position to lend such a huge amount to the appellant- defendant.
(3.) COUNSEL for the appellant-defendant, while referring to the judgment of this Court in Santa Singh v. Arjan Singh, 1992(2) Recent Revenue Report 195, contends that in this case, the plaintiff has not proved that he was in capacity to make the payment of Rs. 99,000/- at the time of execution of pronote and receipt. In my opinion, once the plaintiff has proved that the pronote and receipt were duly executed in accordance with law, then presumption under Section 118(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act for passing of the consideration arises and the defendant can rebut that presumption by leading evidence. In this case, defendant did not lead any evidence either to show that the alleged documents were forged and fabricated or to the effect that no consideration was passed at the time of execution of the pronote and receipt, but it has also been proved that the defendant executed these documents after receiving the consideration of Rs. 99,000/-. In such a situation, in my opinion, the plaintiff is not further required to prove his capacity to make the said payment at the time of execution of the pronote and receipt. The judgment relied upon by counsel for the appellant is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgments and decree, passed by both the courts below.