(1.) This petition is a typical example of cases where the employees first seek to subvert the administrative discipline and when they find that their efforts have proved futile, they approach the Court for the avowed purpose of protection of their legal and constitutional rights.
(2.) It appears that the petitioner's days of ascendancy in the service ended in the year 1992 because the Director General of Police, Haryana suo motu took cognizance of the patently illegal orders passed by the then Deputy Inspector General of Police, Hisar Range, Hisar expunging the adverse remarks made in the Annual Confidential Reports and he ordered that those adverse remarks should be reconstructed in the confidential reports of the petitioner. This is borne out from Annexure P15 dated June 13, 1992 and Annexure P16 dated 17.6.1992. After issue of orders Annexures P15 and P16, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Hisar issued notice Annexure P17 dated 18.1.1993 for removal of petitioner's name from List 'E' and for his reversion to the post of Assistant Sub Inspector of Police. Immediately thereafter the petitioner moved this Court and challenged the orders passed by the Director General of Police for reconstruction of the adverse remarks in his confidential reports. A Division Bench of the Court allowed the writ petition on March 20, 1993 and quashed the orders passed by the Director General of Police with liberty to the respondents to pass appropriate order in accordance with law. Thereafter, the Director General of Police issued notice Annexure P19 dated 19.6.1995 and called upon the petitioner to show cause as to why orders dated 6.9.1990 and dated 6.12.1990 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police may not be set aside and consequential service benefits given to him may not be withdrawn. The petitioner made representation Annexure P20 and submitted that there was no justification to set aside the orders passed by Deputy Inspector General of Police. After considering the reply filed by the petitioner, the Director General of Police, Haryana, issued the impugned order Annexure P21 dated 17.11.1995 and set aside the orders passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Hisar on 6.9.1990 and 6.12.1990.
(3.) The first and foremost argument advanced by Shri Malik, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that after a lapse of two years of the passing of the orders expunging the adverse remarks by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, it was not at all justified for the Director General of Police to order reconstruction of the adverse remarks in complete violation of the principles of natural justice and once the Court has quashed the orders passed by the Director General of Police, there can be no reason or justification to again reconstruct those adverse remarks. Shri Malik argued that the adverse remarks made against the petitioner suffered from malice in law and fact and, therefore, even though the orders passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police on 6.9.1990 and 6.12.1990 may not be strictly in accordance with law, the Director General of Police was duty bound to consider the representation made by the petitioner against the adverse remarks and then decide the same on merits. Learned counsel submitted that no period of limitation has been prescribed for filing representation against the adverse remarks and, therefore, the mere delay in the submission of representation by the petitioner cannot be made a ground to nullify the orders passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police. Lastly, the learned counsel argued that no notice was given by the Director General of Police in respect of order dated 6.9.1990 and, therefore, to that extent, the impugned order should be declared as contrary to the principles of natural justice.