LAWS(P&H)-1996-4-76

SUBHASH CHANDER Vs. PIRTHPAL SINGH

Decided On April 16, 1996
SUBHASH CHANDER Appellant
V/S
PIRTHPAL SINGH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) VIDE order dated 12. 5. 1995 notice of motion was issued in this appeal and records were called for. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the trial Court and the learned lower Appellate Court.

(2.) THERE is no dispute to the fact that the respondent before this Court i. e. Prit Pal Singh is a co-owner of the property falling in Khasra No. 331/5 to the extent of 5/18th share. The counsel for the respondent has argued that he has no interest in the shop which is subject matter of the sale-deed Ex. P/1 while according to the recitals of the sale-deed falls in Khasra No. 352. The basic grievance which has been raised by the respondent No. l is that he is a co-owner of Khasra No. 331/5 along with Sat Pal and Sat Pal had no authority, as he was not in exclusive possession to the exclusion of all other co-owners, to execute sale-deed without partition being effected. It is not disputed before me that Prit Pal Singh is not a signatory to the sale-deed and the sale-deed E. x. P1 refers to Khasra No. 352 presently and earlier 332. The total land which has been sold in favour of the present petitioner by Sat Pal is stated to be 26. 66. square yards while the mutation which has been recorded vide Ex. P/3 is for 30. 04 square yards.

(3.) LEARNED senior counsel Mr. V. K. Jain argued that he had preferred revision petition against the order dated 15. 5. 1991/23. 5. 1991 in which interim stay of further proceedings was granted by the High Court but because the said order could not be communicated to the trial Court, it passed the judgment and decree in the case on 15. 6. 1992. It appears that the revision was filed quite late. The provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 C. P. C. cannot be said to have been satisfied on the basis of application which was filed before the learned Appellate Court. In fact the said application would only be an indirect method of assailing one of the grounds already taken in the memorandum of appeal.