MAYA SETHI Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Smt. Maya Sethi, Ex-Draftsman, has filed the present civil petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India against the respondents i.e. the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak, Chief Administrator, Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board, Panchkula and its Executive Engineer, respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 respectively for the issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned award dated 30.8.1993 passed by respondent No. 1 and it has been averred by the petitioner that she was appointed as draftsman on daily wages with respondents No. 2 and 3 w.e.f. 1.10.1989 and she worked continuously with respondent No. 3 upto November, 1990 and according to the satisfaction of the superiors. Her services were illegally terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and also against the provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the said Act. Her case was referred for adjudication by the appropriate Government to respondent No. 1 in the month of January, 1992 and vide impugned award Annexure P.1 dated 30.8.1993 passed by respondent No. 1, it was held that the termination order of the petitioner was right. The petitioner attacked the findings of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, respondent No. 1 on the ground that he had failed to take in consideration the Sundays and paid holidays while computing 240 days in the preceding 12 calendar months before the termination of the services of the petitioner and for this reason she is entitled to be reinstated into service with full back wages and with all incidental benefits including the benefit of continuity of service etc. and the award Annexure P.1 passed by respondent No. 1 is liable to be set aside.

(2.) Notice of the writ petition was given to the respondents and respondents No. 2 and 3 had tried to justify the award by taking the plea that the petitioner had worked only for 207 days starting from October, 1989 to September, 1990. It was also pleaded that respondents No. 2 and 3 did not violate the provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act and no error of the Industrial Disputes Act and no error of law has been committed by respondent No. 1.

(3.) With the above small pleadings the only point servives for determination before me is whether the petitioner Maya Sethi worked for 240 days with the management and whether the Labour Court respondent No. 1 had committed any patent error on the face of the award while calculating the working days of the petitioner. As submitted above, if the entire allowance is given to the defence of the respondents it would be patently clear that the petitioner had worked more than 240 days, in the preceding 12 months of the termination. In para No. 2 of the written statement, respondents No. 2 and 3 had calculated 207 days starting from October, 1989 to September, 1990 though the case of the petitioner is that she had worked up to November, 1990. Assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner had served up to September, 1990 yet from the calculations made by respondents 2 and 3 it would be clear that Sundays and paid holidays have not been included and on this short ground the writ is liable to succeed. In view of the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation v. Management of American Express International Banking Corporation, 1986 AIR(SC) 458, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to hold as follows: