KIRAN SHARMA Vs. STATE OF HARYANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition is directed against the order of suspension Annexure P5 passed by the Inspector General of Police/director, Haryana State Crime Record Bureau, Madhuban (Karnal)on 15. 12. 1995 placing the petitioner under suspension with effect from 9. 12. 1995 due to her arrest in case FIR No. 581 dated 9. 12. 1995 Under Sections 420, 379, 170, 171 of the Indian Penal Code.

(2.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has advanced three-fold contentions in support of the writ petition. His first contention is that the order of suspension has been passed without giving any notice and opportunity of hearing and, therefore, it is contrary to the principles of natural justice. The second contention of the learned counsel is that the Inspector General of Police is not competent to pass an order of suspension. The third contention of the learned counsel is that the order. of suspension could not have been passed with retrospective effect. In support of his arguments, learned counsel placed reliance on a decision of the Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Rajeshwar Savanna v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr. , 1983 (1) S. L. J. 484 and also on a judgment of the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Hemanta Kumar Bhattaacharjee v. S. N. Mukherjee, A. I. R. 1954 Calcutta 340.

(3.) PERUSAL of the above quoted provisions shows that not only the appointing authority to which it is subordinate, the punishing authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by general of special order can place a government employee under suspension. By virtue of Rule 4-A (2) a deeming provision has been incorporated for suspension of an employee who is detained in custody whether on a criminal charge or otherwise for a period exceeding 48 hours. The logic extension of the deeming provision is that even without passing of an order by a competent authority an employee who is detained in custody for a period of 48 hours would be treated under suspension and such suspension is effective from the date of detention. The petitioner, as per the frank statement made by the learned counsel, was detained on 9. 12. 1995 and she remained under detention for a period of more than 48 hours. Thus by virtue of the deeming provision contained in Sub-rule (2) (a) of Rule 4-A, the petitioner would be deemed to have been suspended with effect from 9. 12. 1995.