KABUL SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) KABUL Singh has filed the present writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India praying that appropriate directions be issued to the respondents to pay full back wages to him.

(2.) THE case set up by the petitioner is that he worked as workmen with respondent No. 3, i. e. . The Udheywal Co-operative Agricultural Service Society, Ltd. , Udheywal, P. O. Panjgrain, District Ludhiana (for short 'the Society') and performed his duties as Secretary of the said Society for about 13 years. His duties as Secretary were of clerical nature. However, the Society terminated his services on 21. 5. 1981 without any notice, charge-sheet or inquiry. He served a demand notice upon this respondent for reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. After the failure report, the matter was referred by the appropriate Government Under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act') to the Labour Court, which gave the award dated 7. 12. 1983 published in the official gazette on 30. 3. 1984 whereby it was held that the termination of the petitioner from service was illegal and unjustified. However, the Labour Court (respondent No. 2) did not award full backwages to the petitioner. The ward (Annexure P/l) has been challenged by the petitioner on the ground that the Labour Court was duty bound to order for the reinstatement with full backwages once it has held that the management did not comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. Moreover, the management has miserably failed to prove that the petitioner was gainfully employed after his termination.

(3.) THIS writ petition has been disposed of with the assistance of Shri B. N. Sehgal, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, who submitted that the award (Annexure P/l) has to be modified as it lacks reasons when the Labour Court had deprived the petitioner of his full backwages. There is a force in the submission of Mr. Sehgal. The Labour Court proceeded with the reference on the following issues: i) Whether the claimant was not a workman ? ii) Whether the workman abandoned employment ? iii) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction ? iv) Whether termination of the services of the workman is justified and in order? All the four issues were decided against the management and in favour of the workman. When all the possible pleas have been taken up by the management in order to justify the impugned order of termination and in order to keep the petitioner away from the job, such a management could not and should not be visited with any leniency. There is a categorical finding of the Labour Court under issue No. 4 that no compensation Under Section 25 of the Act was given to the petitioner while terminating his services and in these circumstances his termination was not justified. After recording the findings in favour of the workman on the contested issues, it was not a judicious act on the part of the Labour Court to say that the workman ought to be reinstated with continuity of service and that he would not be paid any backwages. While depriving the workman of the backwages, the Labour Court has gone against the recognised principles of law. It has ignored the consistent dictums of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as of this Court. It was held in Gammon India Limited v. Niranjan Dass, 1984 S. C. C. (L&s) 144 at page 148, as under: ". . . . Even part from this, the termination of service for the reasons mentioned in the notice is not covered by any of the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 2 (00) which defines retrenchment and it is by now well settled that where the termination of service does not fall within any of the excluded categories, the termination would be ipso facto retrenchment. It was not even attempted to be urged that the case of the respondent would fall in any of the excluded categories. It is, therefore, indisputably a case of retrenchment. It is not disputed that the pre-requisite for a valid retrenchment as a laid down in Section 25-F has not been complied with and, therefore, the retrenchment bringing about termination for service is ab initio void. '