RAIZADA LUXMI NARAIN Vs. FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner abandoned 94 standard acres 14-3/4 units of land in Pakistan, which included the land owned by him in villages Langrial and Jaleelpur in district Multan. The land is these two villages was claimed to be suburban land. In lieu of the aforesaid land he was allotted 50 standard acres 6-3/4 units of rural land and 7 standard acres 5 units of suburban land in the year 1949-50 on his migration from West Punjab to the Indian territory. On 18.10.1969 the Assistant Registrar-cum-Managing Officer respondent No. 3 made a reference to the Chief Settlement Commissioner respondent No. 2 that the petitioner was holding excess allotment to the extent of 7 standard acres 7 units. The ground, inter alia, was that villages Langrial and Jaleelpur were not suburban and he wrongly got allotted in his favour suburban land in lieu of the land left by him in the aforesaid two villages. Respondent No. 2 vide his order dated 22.8.1972 Annexure P.1 after hearing the petitioner's counsel accepted the reference made by respondent No. 3 and ordered that permanent rights to the extent of 7 standard acres 7 units be set aside and the said area should be retrieved to the Rehabilitation Department. This order was purportedly passed by respondent No. 2 under Section 24 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter called 'the Act'). The petitioner filed a petition under Section 33 of the Act before the Secretary, Rehabilitation Department, Haryana, which was however dismissed by respondent No. 1 vide his order dated 21.11.1977 Annexure P. 3. Through the present writ petition the petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the orders Annexures P. 1 and P. 3 and has prayed for a writ of certiorari for quashing the same.

(2.) The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised three contentions before me. Firstly, he contended that on receipt of reference from respondent No. 3 the notice issued to the petitioner by respondent No. 2 did not disclose the grounds on which cancellation of permanent allotment of 7 standard acres 7 units of land had been proposed. He relied on Smt. Sudarshana v. The Union of India, 1974 PunLJ 481, and Jaswant Singh Saluja v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, New Delhi, 1971 AIR(SC) 748 in support of his contention. In my view, however, there is no force in this contention. The petitioner did not assail the notice issued to him on this basis either before respondent No. 2 or before respondent No. 1. Even in this Court, besides making a bare averment in para 3 of the petition that no grounds had been given in the notice issued by respondent No. 2, no material in support of the same has been produced. Even a copy of the notice received by him has not been supplied with the petition to ascertain whether this ground can be substantiated. I, therefore, reject this contention.

(3.) Secondly, the learned counsel submitted that even while exercising suo motu powers under Section 24 of the Act, respondent No. 2 could do so within a reasonable time. Where there is apparent delay in invoking the powers under Section 24 of the Act, such delay is required to be explained. In support of this contention, the learned counsel relied on Smt Krishna Wanti v. The Secretary, Rehabilitation, Haryana State, 1976 PunLJ 279. I, however, find that the delay if any in exercise of the powers under Section 24 of the Act by respondent No. 2 stands fully explained. As rightly noticed by respondent No. 1, the records with regard to the villages in which the land of the petitioner was located in Pakistan including the record of villages Langrial and Jaleelpur was received only in the year 1961 including the list of suburban villages. Each individual case had to be sorted out by respondent No. 3 on the basis of the record so received from Pakistan and it was quite natural that time would have been consumed in detecting any erroneous allotment.