STATE OF HARYANA Vs. LOK NATH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is Defendant's second appeal against whom the suit for declaration was dismissed by the trial Court but decreed in appeal.

(2.) LOK Nath, Plaintiff -Respondent, joined the Haryana Roadways Karnal on February 1, 1975, as an Assistant Store -keeper, - -vide appointment letter Exhibit P.1, Exhibit P. 1, dated January, 30, 1876. His appointment was on ad hoc basis. His services were liable to be terminated any time without giving any notice or assigning any reasons On July 16, 1976 - -vide order Exhibit P.2, he was placed under suspension. Notice, dated April 6, 1981, was served upon, him to show cause why the payment of his dues for the period of his suspension form service be not restricted to the amount already paid to him as the subsistence allowance. However, meanwhile, his services were terminated, - -vide order, Exhibit P -3, dated March 15, 1982, as the same were no longer required. The Plaintiff filed the suit for the grant of the declaration to the effect that the order, Exhibit P.3, dated March 15, 1982 and the subsequent order, Exhibit P.5 dated March 18, 1982, restricting the payment, for his suspension period, i.e., from the date of suspension to the date of the termination of his services, to the subsistence allowance already paid to him, were illegal, against the rules, arbitrary and against natural justice. In the written statement filed on behalf of the State of Haryana, certain preliminary objections were taken. On merits,, it was asserted that the Plaintiff was an Assistant Cashier on ad hoc basis without being sponsored by the Employment Exchange. Only a non -availability certificate was issued by the Employment Exchange. The factum of the suspension of the Plaintiff and the payment of the subsistence allowance to him during the period of his suspension were admitted. Termination of his services by a simple order of termination without casting any stigma or aspersion on his conduct were asserted. It was averred that his services were terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of, his appointment. Retrenchment compensation as required under Section 25 -F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to have been paid to him. The learned trial Court found that the order terminating his services, Exhibit P.3 and the order, Exhibit P.5, were both legal and valid and consequently, dismissed the Plaintiffs suit. In appeal, the learned District Judge reversed the said findings of the trial Court and came to conclusion that the order terminating his services carried stigma that he was a suspended officer and any future employer may reasonably think that he must have been suspended from service on some serious allegations and may refuse employment to him on that ground alone. Therefore, Article 311(2) of the Constitution was attracted and since no opportunity was given to the Plaintiff, the said order was illegal. Consequently, the order, Exhibit P.5, restricting the payment for his suspension period to the subsistence allowance already paid to him, was also held to be illegal. With these findings, the appeal was allowed, the judgment and decree of the trial Court was set aside and the Plaintiff's suit was decreed. Dissatisfied with the same, the Defendant has filed this second appeal in this Court.

(3.) AS regards the order, dated March 18, 1982, Exhibit P. 5, whereby the payment for his suspension period to the date of his termination of services was restricted to the subsistence allowance already paid to him, the same was not justified. Admittedly, no enquiry was held against the Plaintiff after placing him under suspension and he was never found guilty of any charge. Under the circumstances, he was entitled to the full pay for that period, particularly when his services were terminated subsequently without holding any enquiry. It is most unfortunate that the Plaintiff remained under suspension for over two years while his services could be terminated immediately he being an ad hoc employee. The order, Exhibit P. 5 could not be justified by the department. The Plaintiff was entitled to full pay during that period.