HARBHAJAN KAUR Vs. PARGAN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The controversy raised in the petition under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is as to what court-fee is payable by the plaintiff-petitioners on their suit which is now pending in the Court of Additional Senior Sub Judge, Dasuya, District Hoshiarpur. Briefly the background of the case is as follows.

(2.) The petitioners have filed a suit for joint possession of the suit property, i.e., agricultural land, with the assertion that they are not bound by the sale transactions effected by their father, i.e., Darbara Singh, deceased, on June 1, 1983 and July 22, 1983 as the property in dispute was ancestral in nature and he sold the same without any legal necessity. Of course, in the plaint they also made the allegations that at time of the execution of these sale deeds the deceased was imbecile and had lost discretion of judging his good or bad and on that ground the documents executed by him were void. As a contest was raised by the vendee-respondent with regard to the valuation of the suit for purposes of court-fee, the trial Court has held that the plaintiffs must pay the court-fee on the market value of the suit property, i.e., at Rs. 78,500/-. Though the learned Court has also opined with regard to the valuation and quantum of court-fee payable on various other properties such as tractor, diesel engine, etc. sold by the deceased along with the land in question, yet that aspect to the matter is not in dispute before me. In a nutshell, their learned counsel confines his prayer in this petition to the question as for as the petitioners have been directed to pay the court-fee on the market value of the agricultural land. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties I find that the petitioners must succeed.

(3.) It is not disputed before me by the learned counsel for the parties that in order to determine the amount of Court-fee payable on the plaint in question only its contents have to be seen and in case I come to the conclusion that their dominant relief claimed in this suit is for joint possession of the agricultural land and not for cancellation of the above noted sale deeds, then the petitioners are to pay court fee in terms of section 7(iv)(c) read with clause (v) of the Court Fees Act, 1870. If that is so, then according to the learned counsel for the respondents the petitioner have already paid the requisite or proper court-fee. Having perused the contents of the plaint, I am of the considered opinion that it is a clear case where the dominant relief claimed by the petitioner is for joint possession of the agricultural land in question and not for cancellation of the above noted sale deeds. Almost on similar facts and identical circumstances this Court has already expressed a similar view in Civil Revision No. 499 of 1985 Tara Singh and others v. Tarsem Singh and others, 1987 RRR 373, decided on May 14, 1986 after noticing the relevant cases. In the light of this conclusion of mine the impugned order has essentially to be set aside and I order accordingly For clarity's sake it may be mentioned here that this order of mine only governs the relief so far as it relates to joint possession of the agricultural land in question and with regard to the rest of the claim, i.e., the house, tractor, diesel engine, etc., the order of the trial Court stands. I, however, pass no order as to costs.