STATE OF PUNJAB Vs. JAGAN NATH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE are ten State appeals against acquittal (Criminal Appeals Nos. 520-DBA and 672-DBA of 1984, 286-DBA, 353-DBA, 414-DBA, 417-DBA, 418-DBA, 422-DBA, 431-DBA and 473-DBA of 1985). The common point for determination in these appeals is whether a milk vendor, whose sample of milk was found adulterated on analysis, can be acquitted of the charge under Section 7, read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), on the ground that in the complaint filed by the Food Inspector it was not mentioned that the milk was made homogeneous, by stirring, before the sample was taken. In all the cases from which these appeals have arisen this is the main ground, if not the sole ground, for acquittal of the concerned milk vendor.

(2.) AT the very threshold an objection has been taken by the learned Counsel for the respondents, that the complaints, having been filed by the Food Inspector, the State of Punjab is not competent to file the appeals against acquittal. This objection has no merit because the point has been set at rest by the Apex Court of this country in Khem Raj v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 173. An appeal against acquittal is filed under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code). The provision of this section are pari materia with the provisions of Section 417 of the 1898 Code, before it was amended in 1973, on all essential features. The Supreme Court while considering the scope of Section 417, held that sub-section (1), (which is similar to sub-section (1) of section 378 of the amended Code), is in general terms and would take in its purview all types of cases since the expression used in the sub-section is "in any case". The Hon'ble Judges observed :- "We do not see any limitation on the power of the State Government to direct institution of appeal with regard to any particular type of cases. Sub-section (1) of Section 417 being in general term is as such of wider amplitude, sub-section (2) adversely uses the word "also" when power is given to the Central Government in addition to direct the public prosecutor to appeal." The Supreme Court in an earlier judgment in Akalu Ahir and others v. Ramdeo Ram, AIR 1973 SC 2145, had taken a similar view and it was observed as follows :-

(3.) ON a careful consideration of the matter we find no reason to differ with this view. We may, however, make it clear that this view is not based on the violation of any statutory requirement, but rests on the rule of prudence in the context of the appraisal of evidence. In the Act, the definition of the term "complaint" has not been given nor any preforma of the complaint has been provided. We have, therefore, to fall back upon the definition of this term in Section 2(d) of the Code, which reads as under :-