PUNJAB STATE Vs. BACHAN LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In a suit for permanent injunction restraining the petitioner-authorities from effecting recovery of Rs. 14,615/- by way of arrears of land revenue, the plaintiff-respondent succeeded in obtaining a temporary injunction from the trial Court to the effect that the said amount would not be recovered from him in case he desposited the amount in Court within a period of one month from the date of the order and if he did so, the said authorities would not effect the recovery under the Punjab Land Revenue Act. On the face of it this order made no sense. If the plaintiff was to deposit the amount in question, then there was no question of its being recovered either as arrears of land revenue or through any other process. On an appeal by the plaintiff, the Additional District Judge has wiped out the latter mentioned condition of the order and has granted the temporary injunction simpliciter.

(2.) The solitary point that is now being urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that once the proceedings under the Land Revenue Act have been initiated for the recovery of the amount as arrears of land revenue, the civil Court has no jurisdiction to grant any relief in view of the provisions of section 78 of the said Act till the said amount is deposited by the defaulter. This submission does not impress me at all. The jurisdiction of the civil Court is dependent on the legality of the demand and if the Court prima facie comes to the conclusion that the demand is totally illegal, then it, to my mind, certainly has jurisdiction to grant the temporary injunction which it has granted. It is not a matter of dispute that in the instant case the demand originated from an agreement dated April 29, 1981 (certified copy retained in record) leasing out certain floor mill (run by the canal water and commonly known as 'Gharat') to the plaintiff-respondent. I am satisfied from a perusal of clause 17 thereof that in case the parties were at variance with regard to the quantum or the justifiability of the demand raised by the authorities, the matter had to be referred to the Superintending Engineer, Patiala Circle, as an Arbitrator and it was only thereafter that the amount awarded by him could be recovered from the defaulting party. In the face of this arbitration clause, the demand raised by the petitioners cannot at least prima facia be held to be legal. In view of this I find no merit in this revision. For clarity's sake, it may mentioned here that no observation made above should affect the mind of the trial Court while disposing of the suit on merits. I, however, pass no order as to costs.