LAWS(P&H)-1986-7-115

ISHWAR SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

Decided On July 23, 1986
ISHWAR SINGH Appellant
V/S
STATE OF PUNJAB Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Petitioner impugns the order of the Commissioner, Patiala Division, dated 3rd March, 1979, dismissing his appeal under section 9 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1973, (for short, the Act) against an order of his eviction passed under section 5 of the Act in limine. The short ground pleaded by his learned counsel is that while dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation, the learned Commissioner has not even adverted to the relevant provisions of the Act itself. It is maintained by him that to calculate the period of limitation prescribed in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 9 of the Act, what is to be noticed is that the date of publication of the order as envisaged by section 5(1) of the Act. Further, it is his stand that as a matter of fact no such publication of the order was ever made prior to the filing of the appeal and in view of that appeal could not be treated as barred by time. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I find that the case of the petitioner is full of merit.

(2.) The relevant part of section 9 of the Act reads as follows,-

(3.) Under section 5(1), no other mode of publication except affixation of a copy of the order passed under that section on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises or of the estate in which the said premises is situated is envisaged. No compliance of this later part of sub-section (1) pertaining to the publication of the order passed under that sub-section appears to have been made in this case or at least no such contention has been raised on behalf of the respondents or noticed by the Commissioner. It is thus patent that the period of limitation could not run against the petitioner till the publication of the order passed against him under sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Act was made. In the absence of such a publication, his appeal could not possibly be thrown out as beyond limitation.