(1.) THE sequence in the oft-treaded path is facts understanding. . . . . judgment. Let us face the facts. The petitioner, Arjun Singh Negi, says in this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, at he was recruited as a Lower division Clerk in the office of the Director, Census Operations, Haryana, chandigarh on April 14, 1969. He was promoted as an Upper Division Clerk, first on ad hoc basis on September 3, 1970 and thereafter on regular basis on october 31, 1972. The post next higher in rank is that of Accountant. A regular upper Division Clerk having three years of service to his credit, is eligible for promotion to the post of Accountant. I. C. Sethia (the third respondent) was recruited directly in the same office as an Upper Division Clerk in the year 1970. Having joined as such earlier to the petitioner, the third respondent was admittedly senior to him. On July 25, 1972, an order was passed by which the third respondent who was working as an Assistant Accountant, was posted as a cashier, while the petitioner who was at that time working as a Cashier, was asked to work as an Assistant Accountant. It is not disputed that both the posts of the Assistant Accountant and Cashier are within the same cadre of Upper division Clerks. The order of transfer (Copy Annexure 'p-2') appears to have been necessitated because the third respondent had declined to undergo training in accounts work and had given in writing that he was not interested in being promoted to the post of Accountant. The order, therefore, recited that the third respondent had forfeited his rights for promotion to the post of accountant. On July 24. 1973, an order was passed by the Director of Census operations (Copy Annexure P-3) by which the petitioner was promoted as an accountant on "temporary and strictly ad hoc basis. " In October 1975, the occasion arose for the appointment of a regular incumbent on the post of accountant. An order was, therefore, passed on December 26, 1975 (Copy annexure P-4) promoting the third respondent as an Accountant, though in temporary capacity as he was placed on probation for two years. By means of the same order, the petitioner who had been working as an Accountant on ad hoc basis, was reverted to the post of Upper Division Clerk. This order has ambulated the petitioner to this Court.
(2.) THE official respondents have resisted the action. In the return filed by Shri ardaman Singh, Deputy Director, Census Operations, Haryana, it is averred that the third respondent had shown disinclination for being promoted to the post of Accountant, as at the relevant time, according to the Draft Recruitment rules, he was also eligible for promotion to other posts which were higher than that of Accountant. The situation, however, changed after the final Recruitment rules were notified in February, 1973. As per these Rules, an Upper Division clerk, was eligible for promotion only to the post of Accountant and that too if he had put in at least three years of service as an Upper Division Clerk, All other avenues for the promotion of the third respondent having been blocked in view of these Rules, he represented that he may be considered for being promoted to the post of Accountant, which he had earlier declined. The representation of the third respondent was considered by the Departmental promotion Committee at the time of the filling the post of the Accountant on regular basis, along with the cases of all other officials including the petitioner. After due consideration, the third respondent was placed at No. 1 in the panel which was drawn for selection to the post of Accountant and he was promoted as such. In regard to the petitioner, it was stated that he had been appointed to the post of Accountant merely on ad hoc basis and this appointment had not been regularised by obtaining the approval of the Departmental Promotion committee, which was the only competent authority to select a person for the post of Accountant on merit-cum-seniority basis.
(3.) SHRI J. L. Gupta, learned counsel voiced the grievance of the petitioner and while doing so, confined his attack against the impugned order (Copy Annexure p-4) on the sole ground that the principles of natural justice had been violated, in that the petitioner was never afforded an opportunity of hearing before being reverted to the post of Upper Division Clerk. The buoyancy of the contention will have to be tested.