LAWS(P&H)-1976-11-42

DIGH RAM Vs. STATE OF HARYANA

Decided On November 24, 1976
DIGH RAM Appellant
V/S
STATE OF HARYANA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Section 13-A as added in the main Act (Punjab Act 18 of 1961) by the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Haryana Amendment Act, 1974 (for short, the Amendment Act), was held to be ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature and was struck down by a Division Bench of this Court in The Karnal Co-operative Farmers Society Limited, Pehowa V. Gram Panchayat, Pehowa and others, 1976 PunLJ 237. The attack in the present petition is against Section 13-B of the Amendment Act. The petitioner, Digh Ram, implores this Court to exercise its extraordinary powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, for issuance of an appropriate writ, declaring the Amendment Act (i.e. Sections 13 and 13-B thereof) as ultra vires the Constitution and as a corollary to the same, to quash the impugned order passed by Subordinate Judge Second Class, Rohtak on January 8, 1975 (Copy Annexure P/2). The facts which have provoked the petition may be noticed.

(2.) I shall endeavour to be brief, for brevity is the soul not only of wit but of wisdom too. The petitioner claims to be in possession of plot of land forming part of the abadi deh of the village, which, according to him, had not been partitioned so far. It is stated that in the year 1966, the father of respondent Nos. 5 to 14 and respondent Nos. 15 and 16 initiated a suit against the petitioner, through the agency of two persons, Mauji and Rup Ram; challenging the ownership of the plot in question. This suit was dismissed by the Senior Subordinate Judge, Rohtak, on June 15, 1968 (this date, according to the return filed on behalf of the State, is June 25, 1968). Later on, another suit is said to have been filed by respondent Nos. 14 and 15 in respect of the same plot of land, with a claim that it was a part of the public street. It is common ground that this suit was also dismissed on August 31, 1970. The stand of the respondents in regard to these suits may also be noticed here. The averment on behalf of the State, is that in both these suits neither the Gram Panchayat, nor the State of Haryana were arrayed as parties. Respondent Nos. 5 to 14, not having been impleaded as parties in these actions, pleaded ignorance about the same.

(3.) Coming back to hear the petitioner, it is stated that the father of respondent Nos. 5 to 14 filed an application under Section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 with an allegation that the petitioner had encroached upon a part of the public street. As a result of these proceedings, an order for the eviction of the petitioner is said to have been passed by the Assistant Collector, which order was also affirmed by the Collector. In the return of respondent Nos. 5 to 14, it is amplified that the order of eviction had been passed not only against the petitioner but against his two brothers also, as all of them had been in illegal possession of the street. The petitioner further averred that he instituted a civil suit, challenging the validity of the eviction orders passed by the Assistant Collector and the Collector and praying for a declaration that the plot in dispute was owned and possessed by him. A consequential relief in he shape of an injunction restraining the defendants (in that suit) from interfering with the possession of the petitioner, was also prayed for. A notable feature of this suit is that the Gram Panchayat of the village was impleaded as defendant No. 1, along with the other contesting defendants. The relevancy of this fact would be apparent shortly. The Subordinate Judge seized of the suit recorded the impugned order (Annexure P/2), holding that with the coming into force of the Amendment Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in such matters had been ousted, and the Court was debarred from adjudicating upon the claim of the petitioner in regard to the land which formed a part of a shamilat deh. The learned Subordinate Judge expressed the view that the remedy of the petitioner now lay only in the Revenue Court. The suit filed by the petitioner was, therefore, transferred to the Assistant Collector First Grade, and the parties were directed to appear before the said Officer. The petitioner, it appears, is not happy with this change in the route of the litigation. Without losing hope, he has ambulated to this Court, to voice his grievance. Hope springs eternal in the human breast.