(1.) This judgment and order of mine would dispose of Civil Revision No. 920 of 1975 (Manjit Singh v. Manohar Lal Peshawaria), Civil Revision No. 1472 of 1976 (Manjit Singh v. Sohan Lal Chhabra and another) and Civil Revision No. 1109 of 1975 (Manohar Lal Peshawaria v. Manjit Singh) as a common question of law arises in all these petitions.
(2.) In Civil Revision No. 920 of 1975 filed by Manjit Singh, the learned Subordinate Judge Ist Class, Amritsar vide his order dated 12th June, 1975, permitted the defendant-petitioner to appear and defend the suit subject, however, to his furnishing a Bank guarantee to the extent of Rs. 20,000/- for the satisfaction of the decree that might be ultimately passed in the case. In Civil Revision No. 1472 of 1976 the learned Subordinate Judge vide his order dated 15th September, 1976 permitted the defendant-petitioner to appear and defend the suit subject to his furnishing security for the suit amount. Civil Revision No. 1109 of 1975 has been filed by Manohar Lal Peshawaria as a counter-blast to Civil Revision No. 920 of 1975, filed by Manjit Singh against the order of the learned Subordinate Judge Ist Class, Amritsar, dated 12th June, 1975, by which the respondent was permitted to appear and defend the suit. In the two petitions filed by Manjit Singh (Civil Revision No. 920 of 1975 and Civil Revision No. 1472 of 1976), Shri H.L. Sarin, Senior Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the impugned orders of the learned Subordinate Judge directing the petitioner to furnish Bank guarantee and security vide orders dated 12th June, 1975 and 15th September, 1976, could not legally be sustained as no reasons whatsoever had been given by the learned Sub-Judge as to why the petitioner was directed to furnish Bank guarantee and security. According to the learned counsel, the learned Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to direct furnishing of the Bank guarantee and security when it was found by him that there were triable issues and that the defence offered by the petitioner was not a sham one. On the other hand, Shri R.S. Bindra Senior Advocate, learned counsel for the respondent, while controverting the contentions of Shri H.L. Sarin, submitted that no revision lay against the impugned orders and hence this Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned orders. On merits, it was submitted by the learned counsel that the discretion was properly exercised by the trial Court in directing the petitioner to furnish Bank guarantee and security and such a discretion did not deserve to be interfered with in exercise of the revisional powers of this Court.
(3.) After giving my thoughtful consideration to the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, in the circumstances of the case, I am of the view that there is considerable force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the instant case from the bare perusal of the impugned orders, I find that absolutely no reason has been given as to why the conditional order of requiring the petitioner to furnish Bank guarantee and security was passed by the learned Subordinate Judge. After having found that there were triable issues and that the defence offered by the petitioner was not a sham one, it was incumbent on the trial Court to have given some congent reasons on the basis of which the order directing the petitioner to furnish guarantee and security, could legally be sustained. Thus, in my view, it is absolutely clear that the trial Court did not apply its mind and the order imposing the condition on the petitioner cannot legally be sustained. This view of mine finds full support from a recent decision of this Court in Smt. Shila Vati v. Vijay Kumar etc.,1975 CurLJ 635.