(1.) These six writ petitions (C.W.Ps. 2724 and 2726 to 2730 of 1976) are an attempt to transfer the arena of election disputes to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Civil Writ Petitions 2727 and 2730 of 1976 have not been pressed by the learned counsel and those are dismissed. In Civil Writ Petitions 2724, 2726 and 2729 of 1976, the complaint of the respective petitioners is that their nomination papers for election to respondent No. 2 Society were rejected on the ground that they had failed to produce the clearance certificate as directed in instruction No. 7 of the election programme. Under the statute a person who is a defaulter to any society is disqualified from seeking election to the committee of a society. In order to facilitate the decision on objections which might be raised about the qualification of a candidate, instructions appear to have been issued that every candidate should attach a certificate showing that he is not a defaulter.
(2.) It appears from the return filed in Civil Writ Petition 2724 of 1976 that an objection was raised that the petitioners in that case were defaulters. The Returning Officer accepted the objection and rejected the nomination papers mentioning the failure of the petitioners to produce the clearance certificate as the ground for rejection of the nomination papers. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the decision of A.D. Koshal, J. in Pala Singh and others v. The State of Punjab and others,1984 RRR 451 (P&H), to the effect that the nomination papers could not be rejected on the ground that the clearance certificate had not been appended. We are not concerned with the full implications of the decision of Koshal, J. The question with which we are really concerned in these petitions is whether the petitioners have no adequate alternative remedy available to them. That they can raise a dispute under the provisions of the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act is not disputed before us. If that is so, we do not see any reason why the petitioners should circumvent the statutory remedy and invite the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is not the function of this Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 to interfere in election matters at the stage of scrutiny of nomination papers. Interference at that stage is bound to cause considerable inconvenience and dislocation. The circumstances of the case do not justify any interference on our part in exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. On that ground alone we reject all the writ petitions.
(3.) In Civil Writ Petitions 2728 of 1976, the acceptance of the nomination papers is questioned. We see no ground to interfere in that case either. All these petitions are, therefore, rejected. Petitions dismissed.