(1.) This is a revision application by a landlady under section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. She filed an application before the Rent Controller, Ludhiana, seeking eviction of her tenant in the ground that she wanted the rented land for her own use. She claimed that she wanted it in connection with coal business which she wanted to start in partnership with one Yashpal Tiwari. In support of her case she produced the partnership deed executed by her and Yashpal Tiwari and the licence obtained by the partners from the Municipal Committee for carrying on the business in coal. She also examined as her witnesses the clerk of the Municipal Committee, her partner and her agent. The application was resisted by the tenant who pleaded that the landlady did not bonafide require the rented land. He also pointed out that several earlier applications filed by the landlady had been dismissed. The Rent Controller was satisfied that the land lady required the rented land for her own use in connection with the coal business. He, therefore, ordered the eviction of the tenant. The tenant preferred an appeal to the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority reversed the finding of the Rent Controller and holding that the landlady did bonafide require the rented land to start any business, allowed the appeal and dismissed the petition for eviction.
(2.) In this revision application the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the order of the Appellate Authority was based on were surmises and that there was no reason for the Appellate Authority to reject the request of the landlady supported as it was by documents. He further urged that a petition by landlord or landlady stating that the rented land was required for his or her use should normally be accepted unless there were compelling circumstances to disbelieve the case of the landlord or landlady. He relied on the decision of Mehar Singh, C. J. in Parkash Chand v. Smt. Mathra Devi,1967 PunLR 628. That was a case in which the learned Chief Justice affirmed the order of the Appellate Authority who had found that the landlady required the premises for her own business. The question decided was one of pure fact and merely because the learned chief Justice expressed agreement with the appreciation of evidence by the Appellate Authority in that case, it does not follow that in every case where facts appear to be similar eviction should necessarily be ordered. In the present case the Appellate Authority had, on an appreciation of the evidence in the case, found that the landlady did not bonafide require the rented land for her use. The finding of the Appellate Authority is supported by reasons and I cannot say that the finding is perverse or untenable. It is true that section (5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act enables the High Court to interfere even with a finding of fact if the High Court considers such finding to be illegal and improper. It does not follow therefore that the High Court should reappraise the evidence in all cases when exercising revisional powers under Section 15 (5). The High Court should confine itself to consider the question whether there was any illegality or any impropriety such as reception of inadmissible evidence, misdirection etc. but where the finding is supported by evidence and reasons, the High Court will not interfere in exercise of its revisional powers under Section 15 (5). The learned advocate argued that there were no compelling reasons to reject the request of the landlady. I am not prepared to go so far. That is a question which has to be decided with reference to the facts of each case. If a landlord or a landlady makes repeated applications first on one ground then on another and so on the court will be justified in inferring that the application is not bonafide. I am unable to find any merits in this revision application which is accordingly dismissed with costs.