RAM JAS SINGH Vs. ISHER SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) For a proper appreciation of the controversy, the facts thereof shall have to be noticed, though briefly, as the point which will ultimately fall for decision is short and simple. The contentious parties are the appellant Ram Jas Singh and the first respondent Isher Singh. Both were employees of the Karhali Cooperative Agricultural Service Society Limited, Karhali (the Society, for short); the former was the Secretary and the latter was the Cashier of the Society. The appellant was deputed to act as a Salesman for the sale of wheat seed on behalf of the Agricultural Department, to the members of the Society. The seed worth a little less than Rs. 18,000/- was given to the members on credit on the basis of pronotes executed by them. The remaining seed costing Rs. 6,000/- odd which had been disposed of by cash sale was not accounted for by the appellant. When the defalcation came to be noticed, the dispute in this matter was referred to an Arbitrator under the provisions of the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act. The Arbitrator entered into the reference and delivered his award on March 16,1970. The copy of the award is Annexure 'A' to the Writ Petition. As indicated in this award the appellant admitted his liability in regard to the proceeds of the cash sale and he was made responsible for the same. However, with respect to the amount of Rs. 17,985.13 paise which pertained to the sales on the basis of pronotes, the Arbitrator accepted the documentary evidence in the shape of a receipt, executed by the contesting respondent, which was produced by the appellant. The liability for this amount was, therefore, fixed on the respondent. The respondent, however, litigated further by filing an appeal against the award. The Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies (exercising powers of the Registrar) vide order dated July 9,1971 (copy Annexure 'B' to the Writ Petition) accepted the appeal partly to the extent that the liability for the disputed amount of Rs. 17,985.13 paise was placed upon both the contesting parties jointly. The parties were directed to make payment of the amount in equal shares. With this development, both the parties filed separate Revision Petitions to the Government under section 69 of the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 against the order of the Assistant Registrar. It transpires that the respondent arrived late on the date of hearing and his Revision Petition was dismissed for default. An application for restoration of the Revision Petition was, however, moved. During the pendency of this application, the other Revision Petition filed by the appellant, in which the respondent was also arrayed as a party, was heard by the Under Secretary, Development (I) (Cooperation) who accepted the same vide order dated April 7,1972 (copy Annexure 'C' to the Writ Petition). The Revising Authority after a resume of all the facts and circumstances of the case came to the conclusion that there was no evidence in favour of the respondent on the basis of which he could be exempted from his liability. With this finding, the Under Secretary set aside the appellate order passed by the Assistant Registrar on July 9, 1971. The result was that the original award issued by the Arbitrator on March 16, 1970 was revived.

(2.) The matter, however, took a different turn when the Revision Petition filed by the respondent was heard. The Deputy Secretary to the Government dismissed the Revision Petition on the short ground that the same was not maintainable in view of the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Nachhattar Singh v. The State of Punjab and others, 1973 PunLJ 199. The above said decision was, however, reversed by a Division Bench and taking benefit of the same, the respondent agitated the matter further by means of a Writ Petition (Civil Writ No. 1729 of 1973). Our learned brother R.N. Mittal, J. was seized of the matter and as per judgment dated August 17,1973 quashed the order of the Deputy Secretary to Government Punjab dated December 19, 1972 holding inter alia that the order passed by the Revision Authority earlier, in the Revision Petition filed by the appellant, did not debar the respondent from seeking relief in his own Revision Petition before the State Government. The present appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent after certification by the learned Single Judge is now before us.

(3.) Shri Inderjit Malhotra learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has confined his arguments to a solitary contention. After hearing him as also the learned counsel for the contesting respondent, we find that this appeal must succeed. It is submitted that the contesting respondent was admittedly a party to the decision of the Government in the Revision Petition filed by the appellant. The decision was rendered after hearing him and to his knowledge. In spite of this fact, he did not choose to dispute that verdict by means of a Writ Petition or otherwise and, thus, he allowed the same to become final, insofar as the appellant was concerned. It is further contended that if the order of the learned Single Judge is given effect to, it would tantamount to a direction to the Revising Authority to entertain and hear the second Revision Petition filed by the respondent. This would be nothing but paving the way for the possibility of a review of the order passed earlier in favour of the appellant. The counsel contended that this could not be legally done. The argument is based on sound footing. The powers of revision cannot be exercised over and over again in regard to the same matter, more so when no new or additional circumstance had come into existence justifying a reconsideration. It may not be impermissible to exercise revisional powers over the same order at the instance of different parties where distinct matters are dealt with by the same order. But surely it is not permissible to deal with the same matter as many times as revisional powers are invoked by different parties notwithstanding that all of them were parties to the first proceeding in which such powers have already been exercised. It appears that the attention of the learned Single Judge was not invited to this aspect of the matter. The learned counsel for the contesting respondent has, however, urged that the case may be remanded to the government who may consider the desirability of deciding the Revision Petition of the respondent. There is no warrant for the adoption of this course as this would result in a situation not contemplated by law.