STATE OF HARYANA Vs. RAM CHANDER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This case has been referred to a Full Bench by Narula, C. J. and Tiwana, J., as it was thought that the observations of a Division Bench of this Court in Tarlo-chan Singh v. State of Punjab 1975 Cur LJ 1 = (1975 Lab 1C 986) were very wide and that the decision in that case required reconsideration. The respondent was a conductor in the Haryana Roadways, Rohtak. There was a disciplinary enquiry against him. Two charges were made. The first was that on 21st May, 1970, when he was on duty on Bus No. 1346 he failed to issue tickets to forty passengers from whom he had collected full fare and that he had embezzled the amount so collected. The second charge was that when checked he had in his pocket punched tickets of various denominations. His defence in regard to the first charge was that a large number of passengers had got into the bus at Rewari and that while he was issuing tickets to the passengers as fast as he could, the bus was stopped at Tankri village by the Central Flying Squad for checking. He told the checkers that the bus was overloaded, that he had not collected the fare from the passengers and that he had yet to issue tickets. It was false to say that he had collected the fare from the passengers. In regard to the second charge, he denied that any punched tickets were recovered from him. Before the Enquiry Officer, two checkers were examined to substantiate the allegations against the respondent. No passenger was, however, examined. The two checkers deposed to their checking the bus and finding forty passengers without tickets. They stated that the passengers told them that the conductor had collected full fare from them. They also deposed to the recovery of some punched tickets from the pocket of the conductor. The conductor examined one Som Nath as a defence witness. Som Nath stated that there was a rush of passengers and that many of them had no tickets. The Enquiry Officer found the respondent guilty of both the charges and submitted his report to the General Manager, Haryana Roadways. The latter provisionally accepted the findings of the Enquiry Officer and issued a notice to the respondent to show cause why the penalty of termination of service should not be imposed upon him. The respondent submitted his explanation. Thereafter, the General Manager, Haryana, Roadways, passed the order dated 17th February, 1971, terminating the services of the respondent. The respondent preferred an appeal to the State Transport Controller, Haryana. The appeal was rejected. He invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Our learned brother R. N. Mittal, J., allowed the civil writ petition on two grounds. The first ground was that there was no legal evidence before the Enquiry Officer since no passenger had been examined and the evidence of the checkers about what the passengers told them was hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Tarlochan Singh's case (supra). The second ground on which the learned Judge allowed the writ petition was that the order of termination of service was cryptic and not a speaking order. The State of Haryana has preferred this appeal.

(2.) The first question for consideration is, whether the evidence of the checkers as to what they were told by the passengers was not legal evidence in the domestic enquiry against the respondent. Time and again, it has been repeated by the Supreme Court that domestic tribunals, in the absence of statutory guidance, have the right to regulate their own procedure and are also not bound by the strict rules of evidence. The rules of procedure and the rules of evidence observed in Courts are often misplaced in domestic enquiries. A Domestic tribunal whose procedure is not regulated by a statute is free to adopt a procedure of its own so long as it conforms to principles of natural justice. It is equally free to receive evidence from whatever source if it is "logically probative". In State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa, AIR 1963 SC 375, the Supreme Court observed as follows:--

(3.) Hearsay evidence may suffer from the following infirmities noticed by Phipson in his "Law of Evidence:" (1) the irresponsibility of the original declarant, whose statements were made neither on oath, nor subject to cross-examination; (2) the depreciation of truth in the process of repetition and (3) the opportunities for fraud its admission would open; to which are sometimes added (4) the tendency of such evidence to protract legal inquiries, and (5) to encourage the substitution of weaker for stronger proofs. Despite these infirmities Phipson considered that such evidence could not be truly called irrelevant. A belief in hearsay, he said, was often regarded as instinctive; at all events it was universally sanctioned by experience, since nine-tenths of the world's business was conducted on its basis. He further pointed out that it was significant that relaxations of the rule were constantly sanctioned by statute. We may mention here that in England considerable inroad has been made by statute recently and first-hand hearsay is now admissible in evidence in courts of law. in India too, exclusion of hearsay evidence has never been an absolute rule. There have always been exceptions to the hearsay rule even in courts of law. In fact great probative value is attached to dying declarations and retracted confessions which constitute but hearsay evidence. It is true that in courts of law hearsay evidence is not admissible except to the extent permitted by the Evidence Act. But, there is no reason why this strict rule of evidence should be applied to proceedings before domestic tribunals. Hearsay evidence is "logically probative" though its probative value may be strong or weak according to the facts and circumstances of a case. If it is "logically probative," a tribunal is entitled to act upon it. The following observations of Lord Denning, M. R,. in T. A. Miller Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Govt. (1968) 1 WLR 992 are apt and very much to the point:- "A tribunal of this kind is master of its own procedure, provided that the rules of natural justice are applied. Most of the evidence here was on oath, but that is no reason why hearsay should not be admitted where it can fairly be regarded as reliable. Tribunals are entitled to act on any material which is logically probative, even though it is not evidence in a court of law: see Reg. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commr., EX parte Moore, (1965) 1 QB 4136. During this very week in Parliament we have had the second reading of the civil Evidence Bill. It abolishes the rule against hearsay, even in ordinary courts of the land. It allows first-hand hearsay to be admitted in civil proceedings, subject to safeguards. Hearsay is clearly admissible before a tribunal No doubt in admitting, the tribunal must observe the rules of natural justice, but this does not mean that it must be tested by cross- examination. It only means that the tribunal must give the other side a fsir opportunity of commenting on it and of contradicting it: see Board of Education v. Rice, (1911) AC 179, Reg v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commr., (1965) 1 QB 456.