OM PARKASH Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) WE are called upon in this writ petition to construe Section 21-F (1) of the motor Vehicles Act IV of 1939 (hereinafter called the Act) which reads as under :-

(2.) SO far I have been able to understand the argument of the learned counsel, it is that the conduct on account of which action can be taken under Section 21-F (1), must be prior in time to the conduct which provides an occasion for the Regional transport Authority to take action against the conductor concerned. It is argued that if this were not the position, then it was unnecessary to qualify the conduct with the word "previous" and it would serve the purpose by providing improper conduct or misconduct to be the basis for action by way of disqualification under section 21-F (1 ). The learned counsel, however, does not go to the length of submitting that the first instance of improper conduct or misconduct must always be excused or ignored, but he certainly urges that the first instance of improper conduct or misconduct can be taken cognizance of only by the Court and not by the licensing authority or the Regional Transport Authority under Section 21-F (1 ). As at present advised, I have not been able to persuade myself to uphold this contention.

(3.) IN my opinion, the words "previous conduct" seem to refer to the conduct previous to the opinion which culminates in the order of the licensing authority or the Regional Transport Authority under Section 21-F (1) disqualifying the holder of a conductor's licence for holding or obtaining such a licence. This seems to me to be the plain meaning of the language used in Section 21-F (1) and also seems to me to be supported by commonsense. It is difficult to postulate the position that the first instance of improper conduct or misconduct should be outside the jurisdiction of the departmental authority and should be punishable only by the court. It is extremely doubtful if all types of improper conduct, particularly like the conduct which concerns us in this case, would be punishable by the Court, In any case under Section 21-G, the Court has merely been given the additional power of disqualifying the person convicted by it for an offence under the Act and not for merely disqualifying such a person for an improper conduct or a misconduct as contemplated by Section 21-F (1 ). The less serious lapses on the part of a holder of a conductor's licence have, in my opinion, been appropriately left to the departmental authorities and it is only the more serious conduct amounting to an offence under the Act which is to be tried by the Court. The analogy of first conviction and second conviction known to criminal jurisprudence is also inapt. I am, therefore, inclined, as at present advised, to repel the petitioner's contention. Even if the language used were in its literal import also capable of the meaning urged by the petitioner's counsel, I would have felt hesitant to adopt it for the reasons already stated. It is an important index of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary, though, of course, normally, the words in their ordinary meaning convey prima facie legislative intent. Statutes, it may be kept in view, always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic discovery is largely a safer guide to their meaning.