RATTAN CHAND Vs. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND ANR.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) RATTAN Chand. Petitioner claims to have been working as petition -writer since 1932. He duly obtained a licence under Rule 12 of the Punjab Document Writers Licensing Rules 1961 (hereinafter called the Punjab rules), which were framed by the Inspector -General of Registration, Punjab, in exercise of powers conferred by Section 69(1)(bb) of the Indian Registration Act, 16 of 1908. On June 13, 1963, Respondent No. 2 served a 'Show -cause' notice on the Petitioner charging him with violation of the conditions of licence contained in Rule 14(d) and 14(g) of the above -said Punjab rules on the allegation that the Petitioner had failed to endorse on a document scribed by him the fee charged by the Petitioner and on the further allegation that the Petitioner had got the document in question registered as a release deed, though it should have been described as a conveyance deed and an additional stamp duty of Rs. 15 paid thereon. Petitioner submitted his detailed reply to the 'Show -cause' notice. By order, dated November 23, 1965, the Registrar, Gurdaspur, ordered the suspension of the petition -writing licence of the Petitioner for one year on both the above -said counts, under Rule 15 of the Punjab rules, 'the Petitioner made a representation against the said, order to Respondent No. 2, which was again sent to the first Respondent, who rejected the same by his order, dated March 8, 1966 (Annexure 'E'). It is the above -said order of punishment and order of rejection of his revision petition that the Petitioner has impugned in these proceedings, under Article 226 of the Constitution, It is firstly contended by Mr. S.S. Mahajan the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that Rule 15 is violative of the rule of law, as no provision for any appeal or revision being filed against the orders imposing punishment under that rule has been made either in the Punjab rules or in the Act. I find no force in this argument. So far as I am aware, it has never been held that a statutory rule conferring on a Tribunal or authority the power to punish a licensee for violation of conditions of his licence, is unconstitutional and invalid, merely because no appeal has been provided against it. The learned Counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dwarka Prasad -Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh : A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 224 and claimed that Rule 15 confers unfettered jurisdiction on the Registrar and/or the Inspector -General of Registration to punish a defaulter and was, therefore, invalid. The argument appears to be wholly mis -conceived. Rule 15 of the Punjab rules reads as follows:

(2.) THE counsel then argued that though he inadvertently omitted to comply with the requirements of Rule 14(d) on account of rush of work no loss has been caused to the Government on account of violation of Rule 15(g), even if it is presumed to have been violated as the Petitioner has already deposited a sum of Rs. 15 in the Government treasury under protest. I regret to say that this argument is again misconceived. The Petitioner has been punished for violation of two conditions of his licence. He has admitted his fault in respect of one, though he claims to be exonerated from liability to punishment for that default on account of inadvertence. The requirement of Rule 14(g) is very salutary and fixes the responsibility of petition -writers to see that the documents scribed by them are written on stamp -papers of proper value and that the documents are classified according to their substance.

(3.) IT is then urged by the counsel that the finding recorded by the punishing authority against the Petitioner, are not supported by any reasons. If an appeal, or a revision had been provided against the order of punishment, I could expect the order being supported by reasons and might have held that an order which is not so supported, is liable to be set aside, but it is difficult to hold that an order which is final and against which no appeal or revision is provided, must be made a speaking order by quasi -judicial or administrative Tribunals in every case. I do not, therefore, find any infirmity of there type in the impugned orders.