ROOP LAL MEHRA Vs. KAMLA SONI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A double -storeyed house on Original Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, belongs to Kamla Soni, Respondent. The first floor of the house is let to Roop Lal Appellant. The landlady applied for the tenant's eviction from the first floor on the ground that she "bona fide required it for occupation as a residence for herself and that she had "no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation". It appears that at the same time by a separate application, the landlady had asked for the eviction of another tenant who was in occupation of the ground -floor of the house and that portion was vacated by that tenant and became available for occupation by the landlady. The Respondent did not go into the occupation of that portion and in support of her claim for eviction said that she actually needed the whole of the house, as she and her family had decided to shift to Delhi from Ambala and they were not used to live in any house in which another person or another tenant may be living. This allegation was made in answer to the obvious suggestion forthcoming in defence that the Respondent was in a position to occupy the ground -floor vacated by the other tenant and that that flat was sufficient for the Respondent's needs. It also appears that the ground -floor flat rendered available to the landlady consists of four bedrooms, one drawing room, one dining room and one office room, apart from a number of verandahs. The landlady's family consists only of Tier self, her husband and one adopted daughter. The Additional Rent Controller was faced with two questions: (1) whether the Respondent really required the first floor for her own residence? And; (2) whether the accommodation available to the Respondent in the ground -floor flat was not reasonably suitable for her needs? Both those questions were answered by the Additional Rent Controller in favour of the landlady and an order of eviction was passed. The Appellant in this Court took an appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal, but did not succeed there. The Rent Control Tribunal had recourse to a number of decisions bearing on the question whether the requirements of a particular landlord were to be left subjectively to his own state of mind or whether the question of accommodation actually in possession of the landlord being 'reasonably suitable' was to be judged objectively and in the context of physical sufficiency of the accommodation and consequently the physical sufficiency of the accommodation alone was to be considered or also the surrounding circumstances relevant to the question of suitability? The Tribunal seems to have adopted the view and primarily on the basis of certain decisions of this Court, that in determining the issue the dominant fact must be the state of landlord's mind and even on the question of suitability of accommodation in his possession, the suitability or non -suitability must be judged with reference to his state of mind. I will advert to the various decisions relied on by the Tribunal a little later, but it would be relevant to quote here the finding arrived at by the Tribunal. It is, - -"Taking into consideration the status of the family and the fact that they are not accustomed to live in a house, part of which is occupied by any other person and the likelihood of the interference in the privacy by the occupation of the first floor by the Appellant, I agree with the findings of the Additional Controller that the existing accommodation in possession of the landlady is not reasonably suitable within the meaning of Clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act". The Tribunal also held that, - -"the accommodation in possession of the landlady on the ground -floor of this house consists of one office room, one drawing room, one dining room, four bedrooms, four verandahs, two stores and one garage besides grassy lawns on three sides. This accommodation may be sufficient for the I and lady and her husband, but we have to consider other circumstances to know whether the accommodation is reasonably suitable."

(2.) THE appeal came up for hearing before Dulat, J., who felt that, in view of the importance of the question raised, the matter should be considered by a larger Bench. This is how the appeal has come for disposal before us. I would now proceed to examine various decisions having a bearing on the question. In Sant Ram -Des Raj v. Karam Chand, I.L.R. (1962) 2 P&H ;, 1962 P.L.R. 7, a Full Bench of this Court considered the scope of Section 13(3) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (III of 1949). The relevant part of Section 13 is as under:

(3.) THE next case that I would like to refer to is a decision by Tek Chand, J., under Section 13(l)(e) of Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act (38 of 1952), reported as Vidya Vati v. Hanuman Parshad, I.L.R. (1963) 1 P&H. 832 ;, 1963 P.L.R. 415. Tek Chand, J., expressed the view, following certain decisions of this Court and of the English Courts that the word "requires" was not synonymous with "reasonably requires" and the landlord was the sole arbiter of his own requirements provided he proves that he in fact "wants" and "intends" to occupy the premises. The learned Judge declined to follow the view enunciated by Calcutta High Court in Basant Lal Saha v. P.C. Chakarvarty : A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 249. The learned Judge was largely influenced in coming to that conclusion by the provisions of the Act providing the tenant with a remedy for recovery of possession and for re -entering if the premises were not occupied by the landlord as a residence for himself. Next in series is again a decision by Dua, J., in Ganga Bishan v. Puran Singh, 1964 P.L.R. 452. This was also a case under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (No. 3 of 1949). It was observed : "As a matter of fact my attention has (sic) so been drawn to Mahabir Parshad v. Mohinder Kumar, where I observed that it is not for the Controller to take the view that if he were in the position of a landlord, he would not have required the residential building in question, for that is not and cannot be the true test. It is the landlord's requirements which have to be considered, though, of course, it is open to the Controller on proper material to conclude that the landlord is not requiring the premises bona fide". I now come to the judgment of Pandit. J., in R.S. Lala Kishan Lal Chopra v. Shri Panna Lal and Anr., I.L.R. (1964) 1 P&H. 863 ;, 1964 P.L.R. 370. It is this decision which largely influenced my learned brother Dulat, J., in referring the appeal to a large) Bench. Pandit, J., was concerned with this very provision as falls for consideration now namely, Section 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act (59 of 1958). His Lordship observed: "In my view there can be other circumstances, besides the sufficiency of the accommodation, to determine as to whether the accommodation already in possession of the landlords was 'reasonably suitable' or not. For this purpose, the landlord can convince the Controller on so many grounds, as for example his financial position, his illness, etc. In the present case, the Controller has found that the Appellant was a retired officer drawing a pension of Rs. 244 per mensem. The rent that he was paying was Rs. 165 per month, which was too much for him. The premises in suit, which he had purchased, were giving him only Rs. 40 per mensem. The accommodation therein was much more than what was in his possession. Under these circumstances, he rightly came to the conclusion that the residential accommodation with the landlord was not reasonably suitable for him and he could, therefore, reject the tenants from the premises in dispute." The latest decision of this Court is again by Dua, J., in Subhadran Devi and Ors. v. Sunder Das and Anr., 1964 P.L.R. 1214. The learned Judge reiterated the view taken by him earlier and concluded that the word 'requires' appears to connote something less than absolute necessity considered in the limited background of the legal obligations of the landlord and though it does not mean mere wish and may contain to a certain extent an element of need; but if accommodation in possession of the owner is somewhat inadequate for his requirements, he is not debarred from making himself more comfortable in the premises owned by him if he can show that he has a bona fide intention of occupying it.