SANTI Vs. PRITAM SINGH SARWAN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE question which has to be answered in this reference briefly is whether a dismissed application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis accompanied by a memorandum of appeal has to be treated as an appeal to obtain the advantage of a fresh start of limitation under Clause 2 of the third column of Article 182 of the indian Limitation Act, 1908? The material portion of this Article is in these terms :description of application. Period of Limitation. Time from which perioto run. 182. For the execution of a decree or three years ;. . . . 1. The date of the decreorder of any Civil Court not provided for by Article 183 or by 2. (Where there has been section 48 of the Civil P. C. , 1908. the date of the final order of the Appellate

(2.) THE point has arisen in this revision petition involving a small amount of Rs. 583-4-0 for which Harnam Singh obtained a decree from the Court of the subordinate Judge, Sangrur, on 31st of March, 1959, against the respondent pritam Singh. The judgment-debtor filed application No. 21 on 29th of April 1959, for permission to appeal in forma pauperis. The application was accompanied by a memorandum of appeal. The application was opposed by the decree-holder harnam Singh and the learned District Judge of Sangrur in his order of 12th of august 1959, returned a finding in favour of the decree-holder on the question of pauperism of the judgment-debtor and dismissed the application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The operative portion of the order is in these words:--

(3.) IF the order of the District Judge passed on 12th of August 1959, is a final order in an appeal the application for execution filed by the petitioner-decree-holder would clearly be in time. If, however, that is not so, the date of the decree would be the starting point of limitation and in that case the decision of the Courts below will have to be upheld. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the decree-holder that there being no definition of 'appeal' in the Code of Civil procedure, its concept cannot be confined within narrow limits and the judgment-debtor himself having taken steps to file an appeal the decree-holder should not be denied the advantage of computing the period of limitation from the time when the final order was passed by the District Judge, Sangrur, on 12th of August 1959. We have derived guidance from a decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in nagendranath Dey v. Sureshchandra Dey, ILR 60 Cal 1: (AIR 1932 PC 165 ). The question in that case also related to the starting point of limitation under Article 182 (2), Schedule I of the Indian Limitation Act of 1908. Sir Dinshah Mulla, delivering the judgment of the Board, said thus :--