BANSI Vs. ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR CONSOLIDATION OF HOLDINGS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) LETTERS Patent Appeal No. 86 of 1966 is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated the 3rd March, 1966, dismissing Civil Writ No. 3005 of 1965 in which the petitioners were Bansi and Jai Dyal sons of Ram Narain of village Patikra, District Mohindergarh, and it was admitted by the Motion Bench to the Full Bench.

(2.) THE petitioners in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India prayed for quashing the order made by the Assistant Director, Consolidation of holdings, Rohtak (respondent No. 2 to the petition) allowing the appeal of respondents Nos. 3 to 7 in a consolidation matter and further the order of the additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Rohtak rejecting the petitioners' application under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (Act No. 50 of 1948) against the order of the Assistant Director, Consolidation of Holdings. A similar application (Civil Writ no. 2946 of 1965) was filed by the petitioners and was dismissed in limine on the 3rd December, 1965, by the Motion Bench comprising of Falshaw C. J. and Khanna j. It was submitted in sub-paragraph (i) of paragraph 12 of Civil Writ No. 3005 of 1965 that the dismissal in limine of the previous writ petition, did not bar the filing of the second petition. Civil Writ No. 3005 of 1965 was admitted by the Bench consisting of Mehar Singh and Pandit JJ. and when it came up for hearing before Shamsher Bahadur J. he on the basis of the Bench judgment in Kirpal Singh v. Union of India, 1965 Pun LR 862 held that when a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution had been dismissed in limine by a Bench of this Court, it cannot again be revived by another petition in which substantially the same allegations are made again. It was submitted before him that certain authorities of this Court were not considered in the Bench decision but the learned Single Judge quite properly held that sitting singly he could not reopen it once again and he observed that if so advised the petitioners could go in appeal and agitate this matter again for reference of the question to a Full Bench. That is how this Letters Patent Appeal is before the Full bench.

(3.) MR. G. C. Mital, learned counsel for the appellants, has placed his main reliance on certain observations contained in Daryao v. State of U. P. , AIR 1961 SC 1457. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing with six writ petitions under article 226 of the Constitution in which the respondents had raised a common preliminary objection that the writ petitions were not maintainable on the ground that in each case the petitioners had moved the High Court for a similar writ under article 226 of the Constitution and the High Court had rejected those petitions. It was contended that the dismissal of a writ petition filed by a party for obtaining an appropriate writ creates a bar of res judicata against a similar petition filed in the supreme Court under Article 32 on the same or similar facts and praying for the same or similar writ. The conclusion reached on the preliminary objection was as stated in paragraph 10 of the judgment, which it would be desirable to reproduce in full as it forms the main plank of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants before us.