MAHAN SINGH Vs. RANA PARTAP

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts leading to this petition for revision are briefly as follows: Rana Pratap resident of village Bela, Tehsil Rupar, District Ambala, filed a complaint on 4th of July, 1951, in the Court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Rupar, undr S. 447, Indian Penal Code, against Mahan Singh and Pritam Singh of the same village. It was sent to the Panchayat for village Bela for decision. It appears that sometimes in 1953 Pritam Singh, one of the accused, was elected a Panch and then Sarpanch of this village during the pendency of this petition. The case was then transferred by order dated 10th of June, 1954, to the Chamkaur Sahib Panchayat which village is only a few miles away from village Bela. The Panchayat examined the witnesses again and then came to the conclusion that the accused had taken illegal possession of the land in dispute and had made the thoroughfare as their own property and had blocked the complaint's passage. The Panchayat admonished the accused and ordered them to remove the wall in question. The accused filed a revision petition before Shri. P. S. Multani, Magistrate, First Class, Ambala, who held the complainant had a right of passage through the land in dispute and the accused had no justification for blocking that passage. Accordingly the order of the Panchayat directing the accused to demolish the wall was upheld. The Magistrate, however, suggested in his order that the accused (Mahan Singh) can establish his right over the disputed land in civil Courts if so advised. The accused have filed this petition in this Court under S. 439, Criminal Procedure Code.

(2.) Shri Shamair Chand on behalf of the complainant respondent raised a preliminary objection to this petition for revision to the effect that this petition under section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, was not competent as the Panchayat Act did not confer any such right on this Court. There is force in this contention. The gram Panchayat Act established a Panchayat by name in every Gram Panchayat area and its members are partly elected an partly nominated (Section 5 of the Act). Every Panchayat has been given criminal judicial powers for trial of certain ffences specified in the Act and it is laid down that when it tries a criminal case it is deemed to be a criminal Court (Section 40 (2)). The Act prescribes the procedure which is to be adopted by the Panchayats when exercising their criminal jurisdiction and it is laid down in Section 66(1) that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and of the Evidence Act shall not apply to a Panchayat, save to the extent mentioned in the Gram Panchayat Act. There is no provision in this Act which applies Section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, to the proceedings taken under it. In face the provisions of the Act exclude the applicability of section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, by necessary implication. The District Magistrate is given supervisory jurisdiction to cancel or modify any order of the Panchayat if he is satisfied that a failure of justice has occurred (Section 65) and subject to this supervisory power no sentence or order is subject to any appeal or revision by any other Court or authority (section 77 (1)). It follows from these provisions of the Act that the order of sentence passed by a Panchayat in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction is final subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the District Magistrate. This necessarily excludes the applicability of Section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, to these proceedings and this Court has no jurisdiction to set aside or modify any order of the Panchayat under the provisions of this Act or under Criminal Procedure Code. It must be remembered that the revisional jurisdiction is entirely a creature of statute and it has been held in Pashupati Bharti v. Secy. of State, AIR 1938 FC 1, that the High Court has no inherent power of revision over subordinate Courts within its jurisdiction. The preliminary objection therefore succeeds and I hold that this Court cannot under Section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, interfere with the sentence or order of the Panchayat passed in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction. It is, however, open to this Court to scrutinize an order of the Panchayat under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India which confer powers of supervision and superintendence over all Courts or tribunals throughout the territories within the jurisdiction of this Court. The Panchayats are deemed to the Courts under Section 40 (2) of the Act and therefore this Court has power of supervision and superintendence over them. I have therefore decided to consider this case on merits under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution both of which are wide enough to enable me to do so.

(3.) Shri H. S. Doabia, the learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the Panchayat of village Chamkaur Sahib had no jurisdiction to try this case. The objection is based on two grounds: (1) that Pritam Singh, one of the petitioners, being the Sarpanch of village Bela, no Panchayat had any jurisdiction to try him and (2) that the Panchayat of village Chamkaur Sahib had no jurisdiction to try the petitioners, for the offence which was alleged to have been committed by them was done outside its territorial jurisdiction and within the territorial jurisdiction of the Panchayat of village Bela. These objections are based on the following facts. The complaint in the present case was filed on the allegation that the offence was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of village Bela. The Panchayat of this village then tried the case and recorded the evidence, but before it was finally disposed of Pritam Singh was elected a Panch of this village and then the Sarpanch n 3rd of September 1953. On the complainant's application the District Magistrate transferred the case to the Panchayat of village Chamkaur Sahib under the proviso to Section 41 of the Act. The case was decided by the transferee Court by order dated 30th of March, 1955.