MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, PATHANKOT Vs. ROSHAN LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition raises the question whether the learned District Judge was justified in dismissing an appeal filed by the Municipal Committee of Pathankot on the ground that it had not authorised the filing of the appeals.

(2.) On the application of certain tenants the Rent Controller of Pathankot fixed the rent of certain vacant sites belonging to the Municipal Committee of Pathankot at Re. 1/- per mensem per site. One Munshi Ram, who held a general power of attorney from the Municipal Committee presented an appeal from the order, but an objection was promptly raised on behalf of the tenant that the appeal had not been properly presented as the Committee had passed no resolution authorising the filing of the appeal. The learned District Judge upheld this objection and dismissed the appeal holding that although Munshi Ram held a general power of attorney on behalf of the Committee and although he was authorised to prosecute the appeal, he was not authorised to decide whether the appeal should or should not be filed. The Committee has come to this Court in revision and the question for this Court is whether the learned District Judge has come to a correct determination in point of law.

(3.) The judgment of the learned District Judge appears to be based on certain observations appearing in Secretary, Notified Area Committee, Okara v. Kidar Nath, 1932 AIR(Lah) 388. In this case the Secretary of a Notified Area Committee brought suits against certain persons for recovery of rent on objection being taken that the institution of the suits had not been sanctioned by the Committee it passed a resolution delegating its rights to the Secretary to decide whether suits shall or shall not be brought against any person and that the suits had been instituted in pursuance of that resolution. Dalip Singh, J. held that there was nothing in the Municipal Act which empowered a Municipal Committee to delegate its powers of deciding whether a suit should or should not be brought, that the suits in question were brought by the Secretary without reference to the Corporation that the action of the Secretary was ratified by a resolution passed by the Committee after the suits were filed, that such ratification was of no avail as the suit must be decided to be good or bad on the day when it was instituted and consequently that the act of the Corporation was ultra vires.