BRIJ LAL Vs. STATE OF PATIALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BRIJ Lal, a nominated member of the Municipal Committee, Jaitu Tahsil Faridkot, district Bhatinda (Pepsu) filed this petition under Article. 226 or the Constitution against the Pepsu State and against the Minister-in-charge Local Self-Government of that State for an order restraining them from superseding the said Municipal committee. This petition was originally filed in the Pepsu High Court but as that court was abolished by the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, the petition has been placed before this Court for decision. The Municipal Committee was superseded and a notification was issued to that effect on the 14th August, 1956, which is also the date of this petition. In view of the altered circumstances I allowed the petitioner's counsel to argue on the basis as if the relief sought by his client was that the Municipal Committee was not superseded in accordance with law. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged only two points in support of his case. Firstly it was urged that the order of supersession was passed by the Minister-in-charge illegally and with male fide intention as he was personally interested in the matter, and secondly, that the notification issued under Section 238 (1) of the Punjab Municipal Act was illegal and not in accordance with law and therefore must be quashed.

(2.) IT appears that the Municipal Committee had ordered demolition of temporary wooden stalls for constructing 12 pukka shops on the same site. The learned counsel urged that the Minister-in-charge objected to this order as he was interested in certain temporary stalls in a near-by-chowk and wanted to avoid their demolition also. The notification issued under Section 238 (1) of the Punjab municipal Act, 1911, is in the name of His High- ness the Rajpramukh (Pepsu) and it appears to me that it cannot be challenged on this ground. Under Article. I66 (2)of the Constitution the validity of the notification cannot be questioned on the ground that it is not an order made by the Rajpramukh, It is not the petitioner's case that the order of supersession has not been authenticated in accordance with law. It is not open to this Court to enquire into the question whether any and if so what advice was tendered by the Minister-in-charge of Local Self-Government to the Rajpramukh in the present case (vide Article. 163 of the Constitution ). It, therefore, follows that the mala fide, if any, of the Minister-in-charge cannot be investigated by this Court or by any Court when the order has been issued in the name or the Rajpramukh as laid down in the Constitution. Moreover, it is stated to the written statement filed by the Pepsu Government that the non-compliance of the orders of Government in the matter of demolition etc. of these stalls was not the only ground for superseding the Municipal Committee, that the Government had received several complaints against the working of the municipal Committee and that after considering all matters the order of supersession was passed. In these circumstances I have no hesitation in rejecting this contention of the learned counsel.

(3.) IT was then argued that the Government gave no opportunity to the Municipal committee to show that the order of supersession passed against it was not justified There is, however, no provision of law in the Municipal Act which makes it- incumbent on the State Government to issue notice to the Municipal Committee giving grounds on which the Government proposes to supersede the Municipal committee under Section 238 (1) of the Punjab Municipal Act. If the contention of the learned counsel be considered to be correct, then no Municipal Committee could be superseded without an elaborate enquiry into its affairs and such an enquiry is likely to take a long time. Such a course must affect the residents of the locality adversely and municipal affairs must be neglected in the course of the enquiry. The object of the Act is also likely to be defeated if an enquiry into the affairs of a defaulting committee is held to be the necessary condition precedent before the provisions under Section 238 (1) of the Act are invoked in the interest of public interested in the efficient working of the Municipal Committee. It cannot be said that the Government has been constituted a tribunal under this provision of law and therefore the question of its observing rules of natural justice or of holding an enquiry before superseding a Municipal Committee does not arise. No case was cited before me by the learned counsel in which such a notice was held to be imperative before action could be taken under this provision of law. I have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting this contention of the learned counsel,