AGGARWAL SONS Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The present Civil Revision Petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeking modification of the order dtd. 3/10/2025 (Annexure P-1) passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Chandigarh in Execution Application/Petition No.412 of 2024, by setting aside/removing the condition imposed by the learned Executing Court to release the amount deposited by the respondents herein subject to furnishing bank guarantee equivalent to the deposited amount and also to restrain the respondents from withdrawing the deposited amount from the learned Executing Court.

(2.) Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is the decree holder and respondents are the judgment debtor. He submitted that the objections filed by the respondents under Sec. 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') were dismissed. He further submitted that thereafter, the respondents filed an appeal under Sec. 37 of the Act, which is pending before this Court but no interim order has been passed in the said appeal. He further submitted that in the execution filed by the petitioner against the respondents, the learned Executing Court by way of the impugned order dtd. 3/10/2025 (Annexure P-1) directed the release of the deposited amount, subject to furnishing of bank guarantee equivalent to the deposited amount.

(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the aforesaid onerous condition, which has been imposed by the learned Executing Court is not in accordance with law and it is only to that limited extent that the impugned order has been challenged before this Court. He further submitted that since the objections filed by the respondents under Sec. 34 of the Act have already been dismissed and no interim order has been passed by any Court, including this Court where the appeal against the order of dismissal of the said objections is pending, the learned Executing Court could not have passed such an order as it is only to execute the award and cannot go beyond the award and no such condition can be imposed by the learned Executing Court. He submitted that it is only when an interim order is passed by the Appellate Court or by the Court hearing the objections under Sec. 34 of the Act in exercise of its powers under Sec. 36(2) of the Act that the learned Executing Court is bound by the interim order, if any, passed but in the present case, no such interim order has been passed by any Court and therefore, it was the duty of the learned Executing Court to have executed the award in its entirety without imposing any onerous condition, which is bad in law. He also submitted that the aforesaid condition, to the aforesaid limited extent, may be deleted and order may be modified accordingly.