PRABH KIRAN SINGH Vs. GURMAIL SINGH KHINDA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The present petition under Sec. 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 has been filed for setting aside the order dtd. 28/10/2025 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chandigarh in Complaint No. NACT-952/2024 titled Gurmail Singh Khinda vs. Prabh Kiran Singh, whereby interim compensation of Rs.4,00,000.00(10% of cheque amount of Rs.40,00,000.00) was awarded to the complainant under Sec. 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as 'NIA').

(2.) The brief factual matrix of the case is that the respondent-complainant instituted a complaint under Sec. 138 of the NIA alleging dishonour of a cheque amounting to Rs.40,00,000.00. Upon issuance of summons, the petitioner appeared before the Court below and pleaded not guilty. During the pendency of proceedings, the complainant moved an application under Sec. 143-A of the NIA seeking interim compensation to the extent of 20% of the cheque amount. The petitioner filed a detailed reply opposing the said application. However, vide impugned order dtd. 28/10/2025, the Court below has partly allowed the application and directed the petitioner to pay 10% of the cheque amount i.e. Rs.4,00,000.00 as interim compensation. Aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the instant petition.

(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the impugned order is unsustainable in law as the same has been passed without proper application of judicial mind and without recording any cogent reasoning. It has been contended that Sec. 143-A of the NIA is discretionary in nature as the word used therein is "may" and not "shall", and, therefore, the grant of interim compensation should not have been granted on mere pleadings of the parties. Learned counsel has further iterated that the Court below has failed to consider that the petitioner has been regularly appearing before the Court below and has not caused any delay in the proceedings or has adopted any dilatory tactics. According to learned counsel, one of the consideration(s) for exercising the discretion under Sec. 143-A of the NIA is whether the accused is attempting to protract the trial, which is absent in the instant case. It has been further submitted that there has been no written agreement, loan document, promissory note or any documentary material which shows that the advancement of Rs.40,00,000.00 to the petitioner. Furthermore, the alleged transactions are stated to be vague and unspecified without giving any details regarding dates or mode of payment. Learned counsel has asserted that the liability itself is seriously disputed and it has been specifically pleaded by the petitioner that the cheque in question has been misused. Learned counsel has canvassed that these aspects have not even been looked into while passing the impugned order and the Court below has merely reproduced the Sec. 143-A of the NIA and thereafter concluded that a prima facie case is made out against the accused without disclosing the basis for such conclusion. It has been further contended that the impugned order has been passed in a mechanical manner and non-speaking in nature. On the strength of these submissions, learned counsel has prayed that the impugned order deserves to be set aside and the matter be remanded to the Court below for fresh consideration.