(1.) These are two regular second appeals filed by the appellant-defendant, Badami, against the judgment and decree dated 28.7.1988 of the first appellate court vide which her appeals no.19/13 of 1987 and 18/13 of 1986 were dismissed, by a common judgment. In appeal no. 19/13 of 1987, she had challenged the judgment and decree dated 17.12.1985 of Civil Suit no.401 of 1984 holding Bhali respondent-plaintiff as owner of the suit land on the basis of an earlier judgment and decree dated 27.11.1973 and restraining the appellant from alienating the land, by way of sale, mortgage, lease, gift, or in any manner, and in appeal no.18/13 of 1986 she agitated the correctness of judgment and decree dated 15.2.1986 vide which trial court had decreed the suit of respondent-plaintiff for possession of the land, against her.
(2.) In Suit No.401 of 1984, the claim of respondent-plaintiff pertained to the ownership of land, on the basis of a consent decree dated 27.11.1973 suffered by the appellant-defendant, in his favour, in an earlier suit no.1422 of 1973 titled Bhali v. Badami. His case was that since entries in the revenue record were not changed in his name, on the basis of decree dated 27.11.1973, the appellant-defendant was threatening to alienate the land, by taking undue advantage of the (wrong) entries in her name. The appellant-defendant, on the other hand, denied having suffered any such decree. She, however, pleaded that, about 11 years back, the respondent plaintiff had brought her to Kaithal and obtained her thumb-impressions on 2-3 papers, after telling her that government was in the process of enacting a law for reducing the surplus area (of 10 standard acres) and, in order to save her land from being taken away as surplus, she should execute a leasedeed in respect of the suit land in his favour, simply as a paper transaction, and possession of land would continue to remain with her. After reaching Kaithal, the respondent-plaintiff told her that the Sub-Registrar was not available on that day and as such, she would have to come again (to Kaithal), after three days, for the registration of lease-deed. Her further case was that she was a pardanashin lady and, therefore, was not aware of as to what was being done. It was only after the filing of suit for permanent injunction against her, that she came to know that instead of lease-deed, the respondent-plaintiff had played a fraud on her and made her suffer a consent decree, in his favour. She also claimed that the suit land continued to remain in her possession. Her case was that the consent decree which had been fraudlently obtained by the respondent-plaintiff, was not binding on her. In the second suit bearing No.784 of 1984, the respondent-plaintiff claimed possession of the land, on the ground that appellant- defendant was in its permissive possession. The appellant- defendant contested it, pleading that the respondent- plaintiff was not the owner of land, and had, therefore, no right to claim its possession. It was also pleaded that she was in possession of the land, in her own right as owner. Maintainability of the suit in the form it was filed was challenged and so was valuation of the property for the purpose of court fee. The suit was alleged to be time barred and also liable to be stayed under Section 10 CPC. Plea of estopple was also put forward. Following issues were framed in the two suits:
(3.) The first suit was decreed, after considering the evidence led by the parties. In the second suit, evidence was led by the respondent-plaintiff only. The appellant-defendant, however, did not lead any evidence though sufficient opportunities were granted to her. The court, therefore, closed her evidence and decreed the suit, on the basis of evidence led by the respondent-plaintiff. The first appellate court upheld the verdict of trial court, in both the suits. The appellant-defendant, thereafter, came up in regular second appeals no. 2001 and 2002 of 1988, against the judgments and decrees of the first appellate court passed in civil appeals no.19/13 of 1987 and 18/13 of 1986 respectively.