HARNAM SINGH Vs. BHUSHAN METALLICS LTD.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE sweep and scope of exercise of power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for permitting an additional evidence is an issue in this petition. Seen from its wording, the provisions of Section 311 Cr.P.C. apparently leave very wide discretion with Court to summon any witness at any stage of the trial or proceedings so long as it is considered essential to the just decision of the case. Is it so elastic in nature that it can be stretched beyond limit without fear of breaking ? Any discretionary powers are to be judicially exercised and must leave out and be free from any indication of any arbitrariness. In this case discretionary powers appear to have been stretched to an extent that it gives an indication of arbitrary exercise of powers and hence may call for an interference.

(2.) A proceeding initiated in a case of dishonour of cheque allegedly issued by the petitioner being managing partner of M/s. Kakkar Steel Forging led to his conviction by JMIC Chandigarh and award of sentence. The petitioner filed an appeal against the order of his conviction and award of sentence in the year 1999 and is pending before Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh. It is claimed that about 20 hearings have been held in this appeal but the respondent has managed to seek adjournments on one ground or the other. When arguments were concluded in the court of Shri Lakhbir Singh, Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, complainant-respondent made an application for permission to lead additional evidence. This of course was objected to by the petitioner on various grounds, one of which was that additional evidence at this stage specially so to demolish the case set up by the defence should not be permitted. Besides, it was pointed out that it was a third attempt by complainant-respondent to lead additional evidence. As is disclosed from the record, first application was moved by complainant before the trial court after appellant Harnam Singh had produced his document showing that appellant did not owe any debt to the complainant and rather he was a debtor of the appellant. Second application, as seen, was moved by the complainant before Appellate Court itself when the court had heard arguments of the counsel for the appellant which was aimed at filling up the lacuna in the prosecution evidence which were pointed out during the course of arguments by the counsel for appellant. Then came the present third application, which is stated to be nothing but to an attempt to fill up the lacunas in the case of the prosecution. Pointed reference is made in the application that this additional evidence is needed to rebut arguments addressed by counsel for petitioner that the claim was time barred. In this regard permission to lead in evidence three documents in the shape of acknowledgment was made. These documents were stately being filed after 11 years of filing of the complaint. Ignoring all these apparently valid objections, the appellate Court allowed the application while observing that no prejudice was going to be caused to the appellant. While doing so, the lower appellate Court has referred to judgments of Sukhdev Singh v. State of Punjab, 1982(2) CLR 318; Gurmeet Kaur v. State of M.P., 1996(1) RCR 781 and Bant Singh v. State of Punjab, 1992 RCR 172. It is viewed that the Court had unfettered discretion to allow additional evidence at any stage of the trial when it is of the opinion that the production of this evidence is essential for just decision of the case.

(3.) MR . R.S. Mittal, learned Senior counsel has mainly submitted that this was the third application moved by the prosecution to fill up lacuna of its case which has been allowed unmindful of its consequences about the right of the appellant to defend himself in a fair and legal manner. Ms. Tanu Bedi has, however, submitted that order has been made to arrive at just decision in the case and evidence can be led at any stage of the proceedings including the appellate stage.