LUXMI DEVI Vs. PURAN CHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioners are seeking quashing of the complaint Annexure P-5 and the order Annexure P-6, whereby they have been summoned for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, hereinafter referred to as "the Act".

(2.) COMPLAINANT Puran Chand alleged in the complaint that he had dealings with M/s. Jain Trading Company for the purchase of wheat from the area of Fatehabad district in the year 2004-05. Bhagwan Dass, Ramesh Kumar, Sham Lal, Rikash Kumar and Smt. Luxmi Devi were incharge and responsible for the conduct of business of M/s. Jain Trading Company. At the time of settlement of accounts in March, 2005, an amount of Rs. 10 lacs remained outstanding as legally enforceable liability. Accused Bhagwan Dass being the partner and authorised signatory on behalf of the firm and other partners issued cheque dated 31.3.2005 for Rs. 10 lacs to complainant Puran Chand. The complainant thereafter presented the cheque for collection, which was dishonoured on the ground that there were insufficient funds in the account. A legal notice was thereafter served by the complainant upon the accused firm and its partners, calling them to make the payment of cheque amount to the complainant within a period of 15 days from its receipt. As the accused did not pay the amount of the cheque within the stipulated period, the present complaint was filed on 10.12.2005.

(3.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners has contended that as per the provisions of Section 141 of the Act, all the partners of the firm could not be summoned without there being an averment in the complaint that they were incharge and responsible to the firm in the conduct of the business of the firm. Further that the summoning order was a serious consequence and the same could not be passed in a routine manner without looking into the contents of the complaint as well as the legal notice and the fact that all the accused were being summoned. Lastly, it was contended that the filing of the complaint as well as passing of the summoning order was a clear abuse of process of law.