BIMLA DEVI Vs. RATTAN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition under Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short, 'the Act') for setting aside the orders passed by the Rent Controller, Ropar and the appellate authority.

(2.) THE other facts required to be noticed for the disposal of this petition are that Bimla Devi (hereinafter referred to as 'the landlady') filed an ejectment petition against Rattan Singh (hereinafter referred to as 'the tenant') in the Court of Rent Controller, Ropar. After framing necessary issues and assessment of the evidence on record, the Rent Controller dismissed the petition on 29.1.1981 in respect of the plot in question on the ground of non-payment of rent and change of user. Aggrieved against this order, landlady tried her luck before the appellate authority, Ropar but she could not succeed and her appeal was dismissed on 9.2.1982. She had no other option but to knock the door of this Court. I have heard learned counsel on either side and have gone through the record.

(3.) IN view of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court, the question which requires determination is whether the findings recorded by the Courts below are legal and proper as this Court has to satisfy itself as to the legality and propriety of such findings within the meaning of Section 15 of the Act. Now, at this stage, I would like to peep through the record of the lower Courts and I find that the landlady has not pleaded specifically in the eviction application, the purpose for which the land in question was rented out to the tenant nor the rent dated 18.1.1965 was proved by her. The respondent has categorically admitted during the course of the cross- examination that he had taken this site on rent for running "tall" for fuel wood but this fact is of no help to the landlady when she has failed to prove her case with regard to change of user of the land in question by the tenant. I find that the landlady sought to prove that this land was let out to the respondent for sale of fuel wood whereas tenant has constructed therein rooms and set up his residence therein and in order to prove this fact she has examined Sh. Ajit Singh Mavi, Advocate, Local Commissioner and Ashok Kumar, AW-4 apart from giving her own statement whereas respondent has led evidence to the fact that for the last 24 years, he is running "tall" in the land in question. The respondent has categorically denied that he has not set up residence on the plot in question and in fact residing in House No. 2847, Nehru Nagar Mohalla. Learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority after assessing the evidence on record and applying its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case concluded that the land in question is being used by the tenant for the commercial purposes and that he has not been using the same for a purpose other than for which it was let out to him. It is settled law that the Court cannot reappraise the evidence to reverse finding of fact concurrently arrived at by the trial Court and the First Appellate Court and moreover the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 15(5) of the Act does not act a Regular Third Appellate Court and can interfere only within the scope of the Sub-Section. The High Court cannot re-examine the evidence on record to reverse the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Courts. In Parveen Kumar and others v. Suresh Chand and others, 2001 AIR SCW 4779, the Supreme Court has observed that in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can interfere only if the trial Court is shown to have committed any jurisdictional error or it is shown that its jurisdiction would have resulted into manifest injustice. After going through the records, I find that the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below are supportable on the evidence on record and they are based on proper acquisition of evidence and cannot be interfered by this Court.